The 55% Dissolution

Anthony Zacharzewski

My first reaction was the same as yours - an elegant constitutional WTF?

Although the back and forth has helped me refine my thinking, I'm still on balance opposed.

It seems like the best case is one where we get an easily-circumvented rule that allows PMs with more than a tiny majority (or clever procedural skills) to dissolve Parliament whenever they want. The worst case in one where a Conservative government is brought down by a rainbow opposition that then can't turn itself into a rainbow coalition. If the nationalists sit on their hands (rather than holding them out for pork) you might get a government that can't stay in office and an unworkable Parliament that can't be dissolved.

It also fundamentally changes the nature of the confidence motion. Rather than being a "no confidence in the Gvt" motion, it becomes a "no confidence in the Gvt and confident I could get a coalition" motion - that's something very different with the option to throw it back to the people removed.

Rhoda Klapp

Why can this not be left alone? Why are people making suggesting constitutional changes on a hurried piecemeal basis? This needs a lot of thinking about. But there is no hurry. What there is a hurry about is the finances. Not preserving this cludge for five years by gerrymandering.

DP

The best way to get fixed term parliaments should be this:

A parliament shall serve for a term of five years,
however an election will be called early if and only if:
1.) A government loses a no confidence vote on a majority of 50+1
and
2.) following a period of 10 days (or some other suitable time frame) if no government can be formed which can command a majority in the Commons the Speaker of the House of Commons shall write to HM The Queen and request a dissolution of Parliament with an election to be held four weeks (or some other suitable period) from the following Thursday.

This takes the entire process of a dissolution out of a PM’s hands and leaves open the option for another government to be formed for the length of the Parliament before a dissolution is called, thus catering for hung parliaments where there could be a potential alternative government. Who honestly thinks the Con/Lib Dem idea would be better?

True a PM, if he commands a majority under this system, may be devious and introduce a no confidence vote and get his side to abstain . Schroeder did this in Germany to get round a fixed term sytem and force an early election, but it has only happened the once in Germany since the war and doubt it would happen frequently here, it wouldnt look good for a PM or his party to do this, thus meaning that a fixed term would become uniformally the norm, if not necessarily always so.

Mark Inskip

Glad to see you are reconsidering your first reaction.

Anyone familiar with the Scottish Parliament (clearly not Jack Straw) will be aware of this criteria for a Dissolution Motion. Its been there for over a decade and no one has objected. It doesn't need a lot of thinking about for a fixed term Westminster Parliament because it was already thoroughly thought about for the Scottish Parliament (and Welsh Assembly).

And remember a No Confidence Motion still only needs 50.1%.

Anthony Zacharzewski

DP: I think it might happen more often here than in Germany, just as a matter of the prevailing political culture. We are used to PMs calling early elections in the UK, in Germany they are not. That means that even if there is some statutory provision against it, there will be pressure from a party that thinks it might steal a march, or from the media, to get the PM to collapse the Government and call an election.

donpatrico

People will continue to smell a rat over the use of 55%. Why not 56%? 50% plus one is plain and simple. For countries with written constitutions, higher hurdle rates are used for constitutional amendments, but they tend to be plain as well - if it's two thirds that means twice as many are for as against. Keep it simple - it looks more honest.

Beefeater

306 + 57 = 363
363/650 = 55% (55.8%)

The Tories cannot dissolve at time to suit them without full consent of Libs. Provision protects Libs' hold on power in coalition. Seems too simple?

Snowman

Alex, you right separating a no-confidence vote from that of a dissolution of Parliament. That’s where the confusion sits. The half plus one will still be enough for a no confidence vote. If a new Government cannot be formed, the House votes, if 55% go for dissolution we have another election.

Am in favour of the 55% level, it does add stability to the whole thing, and can be scrapped by another Act of Parliament anyway.

Publius

@Snowman
"Alex, you right separating a no-confidence vote from that of a dissolution of Parliament." etc.

-- Agreed. Time to calm down over this. It actually strengthens parliament, and I hope we see other moves to strengthen parliament at the expense of what has in the past been an overweening executive.

Ben G

Again, everybody should calm down.

A government still has to be able to command the confidence of the House. In the past, if a govmt lost the confidence of the House, then the Prime Minister of the day had the option of asking the monarch for a dissolution.

Only the PM could do this!

So, even under the 55% rule, if the PM of the day wants to call a general election he simply asks his party to vote against itself.

The 55% rule is simply a clever ruse to stop the coalition falling apart prematurely. That's all.

ndm

I think the idea of fixed term parliaments is misguided and is yet another attempt to emulate an American process without understanding the nature of that process. I have seen little to suggest that Prime Ministers have been particularly wise in their timing choices - deperate Prime Ministers (Callaghan and Brown) hang on for too long and go on to lose just as successful Prime Ministers go to the electorate before they need to.

The President of the United States holds office for a fixed term of four years BUT the President is the executive branch not the congressional branch of Government. The House of Representatives hold full elections every two years and the Senate holds elections for one-third of its members every two years giving a Senate term of six years. Furthermore, there has historically been considerably less party discipline in the USA which allowed legislation to be amended with bipartisan support. This is ending as the Republican Party uses its status as a regional party to enforce party discipline in a way that makes bipartisanship impossible and makes even the two years of a Congressional term seem wasted.

Britain has historically had a weak executive, which is why David Cameron was able to walk through the door at 10 Downing Street within five days of the election - a process that takes months in America. It is ludicrous to emulate the fixed four-year term of an executive given that the American experience appears to be that a fixed term of two years is too long for the congressional branch when the parties are polarized as is the case in Britain.

And as for the ability of the Prime Minister to pick the day - is there anybody here who didn't believe last year that May 6 was the day?

Ian C

I can back this 55% thing just for the purposes of sustaining this Parliament only - while it gets through the much needed wider electoral and political reforms.

Thereafter it must be subject to the chosen method of democratic majority - 1 vote does it.

Dave Parker

I don't think it's time to calm down at all. I'm all for curtailing a PM's ability to seek a dissolution, and I've no doubt that the Coalition partners came up with this idea in good faith as a means of assuring one another that the deal was for keeps. But that's where it should stay - between them.

Imagine a parliament in which a handful of malcontents hold the balance between two hostile blocs each convinced of its right to govern. None will vote confidence, finance or a dissolution to anyone else. Government would grind to a halt in the absence of a 55% majority for dissolution.

Constitutionally it may be that the monarch can override the deadlock and order a dissolution regardless, but that's unclear as the proposal stands. But legislation that makes us more reliant on potentially contentious use of the Crown's somewhat vague powers isn't good legislation.

I'm broadly with DP - the requirement should be that reasonable efforts to identify a working majority have been exhausted: a PM's request should come into operation only after the Leader of the Opposition has had a try at forming a government; perhaps a Commons which won't back either leader should be given a chance to pick someone else. And the Crown should retain the right to refuse to dissolve or release ministers from office on the basis of a spurious self-inflicted defeat.

The two parties should agree that they've gone to impressive lengths to display their commitment to making the deal work full-term, and leave it at that. Ad hoc inter-party undertakings don't make good constitutional law.

Thomas

"Am in favour of the 55% level, it does add stability to the whole thing, and can be scrapped by another Act of Parliament anyway."

Exactly. Parliamentary sovereignty remains and an act could change it to 50% +1 if necessary. But, along with keeping this coalition together, this proposal is designed to have this new rule as part of our constitution. They want it so that it becomes a new convention, so that if anyone wanted to change it back, there would be morals and traditions against them, just like there is for the rest of the British Constitution.

ndm

An Andrew Sullivan reader points out that the 55% level is conveniently set so that the Conservatives, with 47% of the seats, can prevent the dissolution of Parliament.

Ruby Duck

Fixed term parliaments need a get-out. In the current circumstances, 55% means that the largest party cannot force dissolution, and that the combination of all other parties cannot force dissolution ie. there has to be a real consensus that an election is necessary.
Sounds good to me. Somebody can do sums.

Alex

"An Andrew Sullivan reader points out that the 55% level is conveniently set so that the Conservatives, with 47% of the seats, can prevent the dissolution of Parliament."

Then he/she misses the point entirely. The intention is that parliaments *should* last for 5 years, and this provision is designed to limit the circumstances in which it can be dissolved early.

Malcolm Redfellow

You've turned up for the fixture. Donned kit and boots. Trotted out on the pitch. Kick-off. Several seconds into the game, the referee calls the teams together to announce he has unilaterally abolished the off-side rule.

Your reaction?

Equally, any analogy with the devolved assemblies is equally bizarre:
* the fixed term there is four years;
* the Assemblies were created on versions of PR (not the best form, but specifically intended to create "balanced" representation);
* everyone knew the rules beforehand.

ndm

-- Then he/she misses the point entirely. The intention is that parliaments *should* last for 5 years, and this provision is designed to limit the circumstances in which it can be dissolved early.

The intention may well be there but I think it pretty clear that the chosen figure just happens to meet the needs of the Conservative Party in THIS parliament. My view is that moving to fixed-term parliaments is a mistake given the parliamentary system existing in Britain today.

ndm

The Independent reports:

-- Explaining the agreement struck for a new five-year term for the new government, [Hague] boldly surmised to her it was "American democracy coming to Britain –a fixed term parliament".

Yikes. There's a man who doesn't know what he's talking about.