Richard Dannatt's Convenient Excuses

Steve Punter

Precisely or at least arguably correct

Ernie

Sure, the Army had its failings in leadership, just like the country. But the decisions on funding of some pretty basic equipment such as proper protective clothing and footwear was down to cuts imposed for political purposes.

You are quite right to say that the Army cannot be prepared for every contingency it is to expensive and unsustainable, however, the decision to send it to war into theatres of operations which it had not been trained or equipped for was again a political decision.

We have the defence capability of a minor nation, but we have treaty obligations of a world power, again, a political decision.

It is about time that we withdrew from all of these obligations and concentrated on our own defence and security, only than will we be able to afford the capability we need to defend the United Kingdom, not the rest of the world.

Richard

Your columnist ignores the fact that ammunition was rationed and we had third rate communication equipment as well as sub standard footware and poor body armour. Add into that shortages of helicopters and inadequate vehicles and from this you'll note that the Army were missing the most basic equipmant. Hardly asking for newer or better

Think Defence

Alex, have you got your links mixed up

http://www.thinkdefence.co.uk/2010/09/how-to-sell-your-book/

Its exactly the point I made earlier

rodney bentham-wood

Accountability is what its all about.
Political accountability amounts to a wringing of hands and finding religion, or going off in a huff.
Military accountability frequently means losing your life.
'Convenient', join the army young Alex and find out whether you would consider which comments were convenient.
The admitted lies of Blair Bush and Brown or the consistency of RD - he never accepted a party line and tried his best to safeguard his men.
This article accepts all the failings of the polititions and then insults the military by saying ' they would complain wouldnt they '
- not a very nice piece - you should be ashamed of yourself.

David Bouvier

What about Blair's specific decision to prevent the army ordering equipment in would need (uniforms, boots etc) for the probably war for the political reason of not wanting to see it is inevitable?

What about all private purchase of body armour? Is that normal?

What about Brown's personal decisions on helicopter funding?

I agree that Basra needs looking at, and the 4-star donkeys may take some blame. But it seems to have gone beyond that.

Olaf Rye

We are not talking about the armed forces requesting the latest fighter craft and missile systems, but basic things like ammunition, body armour, and forms of transport to get them around with a degree of safety. The senior MOD staff does indeed have much to answer for, but the loss of Basra came about chiefly because the forces were undermanned, under equipped, and not supported politically from London because to do what was necessary seemed anathema to the bureaucrats and politicians. Do you recall a story of how two SAS operatives would have been sacrificed for political imperatives ? Only the quick thinking and moral courage of the commander on the ground saved them. If you send your men to fight, the least you can do is give them the right equipment and enough ammunition. I would criticise the MOD and senior officers for not confronting the ministers and dragging the government through the mud. It is a question of priorities: it was more important for Labour to squander money on bureaucrats and layabouts on benefits than to spend money on the armed forces. We must never forget this, because it is in this political decision that you can see Labour had so little regard for the armed forces.

Simon Stephenson

I think the fallacy of your argument is that you assume it to be unquestionable that an elected Prime Minister and Chancellor of the Exchequer are competent to do their jobs. From this assumption, you are able therefore to conclude that the likes of General Dannatt, who appear to be raising questions about Mr Blair's and Mr Brown's competence, can't really be doing so, and that therefore they are using a false argument to:-

1. Score a party political point

or

2. Cover up for their own shortcomings, by blaming it on someone else

or that they are merely lashing out in jealousy at Blair's or Brown's status in the world.

What if your assumption is wrong, and Dannatt is quite seriously and professionally expressing doubts about Blair's and Brown's competence? What if the very point he is seeking to highlight is that there is a weakness in our current political system that is allowing incompetent people to rise to the top, and that as a result of this maybe it's unreasonable to expect a top-drawer armed forces to be unquestioningly responsive to the demands of a political leadership that is not necessarily out of the same top-drawer?

Paul

Yawn, another idiot columnist! Before you make comments pal, lets see you go out on patrol in Afganistan like the troops are doing now. Poorly armed, shoddily equipped, without good communications or intel, and a hostile population. Not to mention missions planned by an American!
I'll show you Shortcomings? Look in the mirror!

Pot Head

I bet the Taliban are moaning about their gear!

Think Defence

I think the point is not that Blair and Brown are devoid of any blame, far far far from it

But

Blame for basic shortcomings and a lack of equipment also lies elsewhere and that elsewhere is the MoD, uniformed and civilian.

If you read the NAO reports and testimony you will see that a lot of equipment actually was in theatre but because of logistics systems that were taken from Noah they could not be delivered to the right people in the right order. This goes back decades

Therefore, blame should not only be directed to Blair and Brown

ndm

Richard Dannatt in 2006 speaking to the Daily Mail:

-- I think history will show that the planning for what happened after the initial successful war-fighting phase was poor, probably based more on optimism than sound planning.

-- History will show that a vacuum was created and into the vacuum malign elements moved. The hope that we might have been able to get out of Iraq in 12, 18, 24 months after the initial start in 2003 has proved fallacious. Now hostile elements have got a hold it has made our life much more difficult in Baghdad and in Basra.

-- The original intention was that we put in place a liberal democracy that was an exemplar for the region, was pro-West and might have a beneficial effect on the balance within the Middle East.

-- That was the hope. Whether that was a sensible or naïve hope, history will judge. I don't think we are going to do that. I think we should aim for a lower ambition. (my emphasis)
http://tinyurl.com/28lvoxx

While the political decision to go to war in Iraq was disastrous (whatever the GWOT bloodlust crew claims) the military decision was no less so. It was not the "puir bluidy squaddies" who made that decision it was those at the top - the peers of Richard Dannatt. I don't think many of them quit their rank and its associated privileges because they found the planning for the Iraq war to be inadequate. Given that I don't think there is any senior military leader in either Britain or the United States who now has any right to criticize the conduct of the war.

Simon Stephenson

ndm : 9.58pm

Just a moment! How much of the post-war planning was the responsibility of the military? When Dannatt says:-

"The original intention was that we put in place a liberal democracy that was an exemplar for the region, was pro-West and might have a beneficial effect on the balance within the Middle East"

was he really putting forward an idea that the military had come up with? Isn't what we're dealing with here a political strategy, devised by politicians and their contributory services, to which the military would certainly have had an input, but a somewhat limited input?

I'm sorry, but seeking to paint Iraq as fundamentally a military-initiated adventure into which the politicians were dragged reluctantly seems likely to me to be about 180° from what actually took place.

Trina Stubbs

The book 'Queen Victoria's Little Wars explains that even in the heyday of Empire there was tension between what the Government wanted the military to do and how much they wanted to pay for it. However, the idea of the Defence Review in 1997/8 was that we would match tasks against funding. It is easy to say that you accept the military was under funded; just imagine if your editor dedided that your piece of work would only get 60% of what you were expecting. Also defence as a proporition of GDP has been falling since 1980, particular in relation to Health, Education and Welfare. Those areas are the ones that need the serious look; defence is only a small part of the pot these days.

Victor Southern

When Mr Massie talks about losing the battle for Basra he displays a lack of empathy. Why do I use that word? The position of a modern army representing a Wetsern state when faced with armed "civilians" is very different to direct warfare against a uniformed combatant force. The combatants become inoocent civilians in a tick and conduct their opeartions from amongst occupied dwellings. The full force of reply then involves the much-prized collateral damage.

There has perhaps only been one successful campaign of that nature which was Gerald Templer's in Malaysia. Perhaps Cyprus and the Eoka campaign came close. Since then the insurgents have learned a lot and passed the lessons on. Training camps were set up in Libya, in Aden, in the Sudan and in Afghanistan. Iran, of course, was backing the Shiite militias in Basra province.

ndm

Simon Stephenson writes:

-- I'm sorry, but seeking to paint Iraq as fundamentally a military-initiated adventure into which the politicians were dragged reluctantly seems likely to me to be about 180° from what actually took place.

I neither claimed nor believe this to be the case. However, the military is responsible for developing the military strategy necessary to achieve the goals set by civilian leadership. The military leadership is derelict in its duty when, as is the case of the Iraq war, it fails to develop plans for the post-war phase. While Robin Cook, for example, behaved with honour in resigning his cabinet post because he did not believe in the Iraq war I am not aware of any equally senior military official in either Britain or the United States who can claim a similar honour.

revolution

If Dannat had any moral courage he would have removed the dangerous Blair and the rest of the nu labor stooges from office in a military takeover that the majority of Brits would have welcomed?

Lance Grundy

"It wasn't Tony Blair who lost the battle for Basra and it wasn't Gordon Brown either. It was the British army that was, essentially, defeated in the field."

Perhaps though they were "defeated in the field" as much because of political meddling by the Labour government - you know, the one headed by Tony Blair and then Gordon Brown - as through a lack of equipment. Being forced, for political reasons, to fight with 'one hand tied behind their back'.

Graham Cushway, a former private security contractor makes this very point in this article in the Legion magazine. I quote…

"British forces often cannot engage enemy forces because of political meddling intended to transform the Armed forces into a politically correct, health and safety-obsessed facsimile of a government department. Units are forced to prioritise 'Law of Armed Conflict' training, otherwise known as 'reasons never to shoot'.

Military commanders contend that this is pretending that Iraq or Afghanistan is Surrey. Tony Blair thought the kidnapped sailors’ were "…entirely sensible…" worrying that if they had started shooting "there might have been loss of life…". Probably not. Law of Armed Conflict training occurs more frequently than range practice."

Ian Stewart

It seems that to criticise our military leadership has become intrinsically linked with criticism of our servicemen and women. This is not so. And when we talk of underfunding, please remember that in 1982, our Royal Marines were buying their own bergens and boots, so no change there.
There was palpably a failure of military leadership in Basra, as well as the failure of political leadership. Just how great a failure remains to be explored.
Once in occupation, British and Allied forces were bound to a very shaky "plan" worked out in the Pentagon by neocons who thought that a major middle eastern nation could be turned round on the cheap. Wiser heads at the State department knew this was not so, but were ignored, as were successive civilian leaders on the ground.
Strategically, we were in a bind, but tactically we failed as well. Until Iraq, the british Army had a very good record in low intensity ops, now we are relearning lessons we once taught others.

victor jara 67

While you are technically correct that the occupation of Basra was not a success.

More responsibility lies with the neo-cons in Washington and Blair, rather than the army. They based there post war plans on the occupation of Japan and Germany after the second world war. When the Israeli occupation of Palestine would have been a more accurate model.

In Basra the British made a calculated decision not to confront the mahdi army. This policy had its consequences in that it left the non islamist population disgruntled. However the US heavy handedness in the North and the brutality associated with led to the full scale insurgency.
First lesson do not invade and occupy Arab/Islamic countries . Our army were set up to fail.

Del

Massie offers a typical hacks lazy & uneducated post on matters that he has little knowledge off. Army commanders, soldiers on the ground and armchair Generals all make mistakes - some that cost lifes. They regroup, make decisions and move on (or not as the case may be). What Massie confuses is the strategic decision to occupy Basra and the close area. That decision was taken by politicians on both sides of the Atlantic not by the Army General Staff. The Army understood both their task and role and provided the tacticle influence adopted by commanders in the field. The task was always undermanned and under resourced but the role was not for the Army to decide, they simply made the best of a bad job; it was not rocket science, they understood the limititations but just for Massie; the Army will endeavour to carry out their duty, they will argue their case but when the politicians make decisions the entire Armed Forces shall do their bidding and shall complain when the task is being carried out, when it is done and when it is long forgotten - alternatively we have the Army decide what wars it will prosecute and the politicians can take up arms for those it considers i'll fated or under resourced.

Original Tony

As a former soldier I despair that the west is paying so much for this war; not only in money but in lives.

I depsair because we are fighting guerillas with conventional forces. We are using men used to the comfort and security of a base and armoured vehicles to attack men that wear sandals and sleep rough.

I despair at the rules of engagement and comments I often hear from embedded reporters that 'there goes the Taliban to fight another day.'

The financial cost of the war could be slashed if light, irregular forces of a non-conventional nature are used.

Some of you will yawn and say here goes another Rhodesian telling us how to fight but a few hundred of us killed 14 000 terrorists by using simple, cheap methods to kill them.

Our 'fireforce' model has been presented to the British High Command and rejected but I am glad to see the US marines are getting the idea.

We need to see swift envelopment of a contact area by light heli-borne forces that corral the enemy while gunships do the killing. It's cheap, it works and you dont get killed by IED's 'cos you are in the air or patrolling the same paths as the enemy.

A paradigm shift needs to take place in the minds of our senior leaders who appear more interested in their Gin and Tonic than victory.

Olaf Rye

It is wrong to say that the military was negligent in planning for the aftermath of the military operations. The forces made a case for many more troops, only to be told by their political masters that this was unnecessary. Even a cursory glance at the arguments that raged between the generals and the politicians shows that they were told how many men they could deploy and that their advice was ignored. This probably resulted because of Rumsfeld's stupid idea of fighting a war on the cheap.

As Original Tony said, the operation in Afghanistan is being squandered. It is a place where irregular and highly mobile forces are needed to defeat the Taleban and this involves different rules of engagement. Looking at the disastrous situation that 3 Para had in their first deployment merely underscores the stupidity of the political classes: a mobile and highly trained force was made to hold small buildings merely to demonstrate that the Afghan government was in control. The CO was overruled by the politicians. As an ex-para, I also despise the political classes for choosing to meddle in how the army conducts its operations, especially when the politicians understand nothing about the military (were any Labour ministers ever in the ranks ?) and have an inveterate hatred of them.

Ben G

Yes, our troops are badly led. You only have to listen to the Captain Nice-but-dims that pop up on the news to know that.

ndm

Original Tony writes:

-- Some of you will yawn and say here goes another Rhodesian telling us how to fight but a few hundred of us killed 14 000 terrorists by using simple, cheap methods to kill them.

I must say that all worked out all fine and dandy.

Original Tony

ndm- you miss the point, this thread is about the military not getting enough funding and I went on to explain a cheaper way of fighting a war. By the way, Rhodesia did not lose militarily but by political persuasion, the Brits being in the forefront of that I might add.

I am merely trying to point out that western forces are fighting a guerilla war in a conventional footprint. If you dont understand the difference, go to a library.