Britain’s decision to fight on in 1940; Hitler’s to attack the Soviet Union in 1941; in the same year, Roosevelt’s to wage undeclared war in the Battle of the Atlantic; Japan’s to attack Pearl Harbor and expand southwards; Hitler’s declaration of war against America and his decision for genocide of the Jews. These are the choices, together with a few related ones, plus Mussolini’s by comparison less important decision to enter the war on Germany’s side, that Kershaw sees as the keys that turned the lock of the second world war.
Few would argue that he has not lighted on the vitals of the matter, although some might think that the decision for genocide should be separately categorised since it was hardly on a par with the others, which were essentially strategic in nature. The decision for genocide and the resulting holocaust were scarcely part of the construct of the war but one of the most ghastly products of it.





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