Generally good

The appointment of Sir General David Richards as head of the British army, effective from August 2009, is the government’s first inspired military appointment for a long time. A former Nato commander in Afghanistan and the “Saviour of Sierra Leone”, General Richards will bring to the job a keen understanding of the military’s new tasks and, from his last assignment as Commander-in-Chief Land Forces, insight into the real state of the British army.

Richards is probably the closest thing the British army has to David Petraeus – a soldier with an appreciation of politics, an eye for a good photo opportunity, but also someone who can develop a strategic vision. He has developed useful links not only with senior Labour ministers, but also with their Conservative counterparts: “Dave” and “General Dave” are said to have met on several occasions.

But the plain-speaking soldier will have his work cut out for him. The role of Chief of the General Staff (CGS) – despite its history and rank – has been increasingly marginalised, eclipsed in part by the Chief of Joint Operations. Whether or not General Richards can inject himself – and the two other chiefs of staff – back into the military decision-making process remains to be seen. But it is imperative for the British army to develop a closer link between operations and capabilities.

One of the central questions for General Richards is what shape the future Army takes. The current CGS, General Richard Dannatt has argued that the army needs to be restructured, grow bigger, and acquire new peacemaking and reconstruction skill by establishing specialized reconstruction units as part of eight “organic” manoeuvre brigades. I have written elsewhere that Britain and its NATO allies need to improve their capabilities to train indigenous forces, like the Afghan army. How the British army does so in future will be a key question for the new CGS.

Then there is the role of the so-called “military covenant”. Stories of poor accommodation for Service personnel and inadequate support for service families have led many to, understandably, conclude that the military covenant is broken. General Richard Dannatt made this a signature issue. But he did so in a way that frustrated the government. The trick for his successor will be to improve conditions for soldiers - and make their contribution count for more in society at large - without sounding indignant. With the coming recession, everyone is going to be pressed for cash and getting more financial support for the British army will have to be done with great finesse.

Finally, there is the operational question - and above all what to do about NATO’s Afghan mission. The media has been quick to jump on General Richards’ comments that ISAF needs more troops. Without a serious surge of forces - from both NATO and Afghan National Army - into the south, NATO is likely to struggle. In the presidential debate, Barack Obama mentioned he would deploy 2-3 brigades. But NATO is probably dealing with a “two division deficit”, not a two brigade problem. And the NATO alliance does not have that level of troops available, even if the U.S draws-down in Iraq. The question then is how to get more troops and for how long a surge can sustainably remain in place. General Richards will have to call on his network of contacts across NATO to find ways to drum up extra troops.