Musharraf's missed opportunity

Reihan Salam, a Spectator contributor, has a good piece at The Atlantic. In it, he conducts a thought experiment that is worth reflecting on:

“It’s worth wondering what might have happened had Musharraf taken a different path. During a landmark speech in January 2002, Musharraf essentially declared war on the Islamic extremists who’d been hollowing out the Pakistani state from within. Popular support for the government - and for the government’s decision to side with the United States - was extremely high. The United States and its allies had offered a generous aid package, and the Islamists were at their weakest. Had Musharraf sought a power-sharing arrangement with the secular opposition at this point, he would have had tremendous moral authority to crush armed opponents of the government and to reform Pakistani society. But instead Musharraf chose to nurse various Islamist guerrilla armies back to health, to continue to use them against India and, later, Afghanistan. He undermined the rule of law to cling to power, and in doing so he undermined all of the goals he had originally set out to achieve. So it is no wonder that Pakistan's tenuous alliance with the United States has also been discredited in the eyes of the Pakistani masses. After all, the United States stood by as Musharraf made a mockery of his democratic commitments, and turned a blind eye as he armed Islamist militants with one hand while "fighting" them with the other.”

Musharraf liked to think of himself as Pakistan’s Ataturk. But he will go down in history, as just another general who seized power and left little behind.