Nato’s Commander in Kabul

26 May 2007

Dan McNeill, Nato’s commander in Kabul, tells Heidi Kingstone that even a ‘hard-bitten dude’ faces a struggle to make the liberated country function as an orderly society

Three buzz words in Afghanistan are reconstruction, alternative livelihoods and security. McNeill understands that while security can bring about reconstruction, reconstruction can also result in security. McNeill’s favoured example is the current redevelopment of the Kajaki Dam in Helmand. This dam produces approximately 11 megawatts of electricity, but after extensive refurbishment it will have a maximum capacity of 51 megawatts. While current capacity goes to Kandahar, most of the new capacity will go to Helmand, and will be used to help develop the province. McNeill expects that the ensuing development will lead to a more secure region. This will, however, be a real challenge, as Helmand produces the largest poppy haul in Afghanistan — Afghanistan itself being the world’s leading producer — and incentives to shift away from poppy planting have so far been unsuccessful. ‘I asked President Karzai about education or lack thereof in the province,’ McNeill informs me. ‘Karzai’s comment to me was that years ago [about 1979, before the Soviet invasion], when agriculture was good, people saw no reason to get an education because they were making money in agri-business. I thought it was an interesting premise and the more I think about it the more I see it has merit.’

Three and a half months into his command his assessment is that progress has been made in the security sector, where the alliance has performed quite well. He considers it will continue to do well through the summer and into the end of the traditional fighting season. His disappointment is with the slow progress of the Ministry of the Interior — considered the most corrupt in the country — and with the Afghan National Police (ANP). ‘Because we are in an insurgency, and our operations are typically counter-insurgency operations, the police are the force of choice, and it’s not moving along as fast as reform in the Afghan National Army (ANA).’ Nor has he seen as much progress as he would like in the enabling of Afghan governance.