‘If Brown pulls a stunt over Iraq...’

2 June 2007

James Forsyth talks to insiders in Washington and London about the biggest dilemma facing the next Prime Minister — and finds that, as much as Brown might like to break free of an unpopular conflict, his options are severely limited

Britain’s presence in southern Iraq, furthermore, is crucial to any chance of saving the Iraq mission. A former adviser to the Iraq Study Group describes the internecine Shiite strife in the south as the ‘single greatest threat’ to the future of Iraq. Moqtada al-Sadr’s reappearance in southern Iraq following several months of self-imposed exile in Iran is not an encouraging sign, and the light footprint strategy — ‘Rumsfeld plus’ — that the British have pursued has limited their effectiveness. Yet the current deployment does at least act as a check on the situation.

This force also keeps open the US supply — and, ultimately, exit — route from Kuwait and through the south to Baghdad. This job would have to be done by someone even if the British withdraw. It is impossible to see how the surge could succeed with an accelerated British withdrawal, since that would require a redeployment of already over-stretched Iraqi and American forces to Basra.

If the Americans depend on British support, Brown’s position depends on internal American politics and Petraeus’s testimony in September. Unfortunately, this key date makes a major push by Iraqi insurgents in August probable; they have gone on the offensive whenever they have had an opportunity to influence either US or Iraqi politics. As time goes on, British forces could also find themselves dealing with Shiite militias trying to reassert themselves in Basra after seeing their influence in Baghdad tempered by the surge. Yet withdrawing is often the most dangerous thing to do militarily, and a rapid withdrawal presents its own problems.

It is almost impossible to see how Petraeus can announce progress that will satisfy Congress in September. Proponents of the surge point out that it will only be at full strength from the middle of this month and that it is unrealistic to expect to have Baghdad and its environs secured until around March next year. But these arguments are being given increasingly short shrift. Tragically, after years of a failed strat-egy in Iraq, the one with the best chance of success may be given only months to work.

Blair was often frustrated by the Bush administration’s disdain for regional diplomacy; recall the glee with which Downing Street embraced the Iraq Study Group’s recommendations on this point. Brown will have no such problem as the first public talks between Iran and the United States for 27 years demonstrated. As it scrambles to sustain support domestically for the war, the Bush administration is being forced to exhaust every possibility — even those that it suspects are hopeless. Condoleezza Rice will find herself sitting through far more grand UN-organised regional summitry than her predecessors.

But the likelihood remains that Brown will initially confine himself to changing the rhetorical emphasis of the mission from security to rebuilding — and to announcing a clearer departure plan than anything offered by Blair. He is unlikely, in other words, to order a pullout by March next year. The ongoing challenge for him will be to stay ahead of the game in Washington. But in doing that Brown must avoid pushing the US into a premature withdrawal that could well dwarf the horrors we have already witnessed in Iraq.