The generals must share the blame

14 October 2009

It’s fashionable for military top brass to attack politicians when things go wrong. But, says Paul Robinson, many of the army’s problems are of their own making

We live in a remarkably peaceful era. There is no direct military threat to the United Kingdom, and the magnitude of global conflict has declined by 60 per cent in two decades. Nonetheless, the top brass have embraced the new purpose with zeal. Their existence depends on it.

All these factors together mean that the armed forces are institutionally averse to recognising a fundamental truth — that the problems they have faced in Iraq and Afghanistan derive not from a lack of resources but from the very nature of the missions themselves. Recognising this would mean admitting that expeditionary warfare is not a good idea, and admitting that would cast the whole defence budget into doubt. Blaming Mr Brown provides a convenient way out of this impasse.

In 1997, the Labour government gave the country a new strategic direction. It has not worked out well. If, as expected, the Conservatives take power next year, they will inherit and complete the latest defence review. In the process, future defence ministers, including possibly General Dannatt, need to do more than merely juggle resources. They need to re-examine fundamental strategic assumptions. The stab-in-the-back myth stands in the way. It maintains the pretence that the basic direction was all right, and merely the implementation went wrong, so that all can be solved with the application of additional funds. While this story may serve some narrow bureaucratic interests, it does the people of Britain no service at all.

Paul Robinson is a professor in the Graduate School of International Affairs at the University of Ottawa. He has been a military intelligence officer in both the British army, as a regular officer, and the Canadian forces, as a reservist.