Monty Python’s guide to the Darfur conflict

Jackie Bonisteel

Mr. Marozzi acknowledges that UNAMID desperately needs helicopters and 16000 peacekeepers. Yet, rather than suggesting means of securing these necessities, he censures the Darfur lobby for failing to recognize the increasingly complex nature of the conflict. In doing so, he risks shifting focus from the real question: what can we do today to end the suffering?

The aim of the Darfur advocacy community is to pressure those in power to do what is required to end the violence. The majority of us are fully aware that the situation is not one of “good versus evil”. At Stand Canada, our policy recommendations, which include the appointment of a Canadian special envoy to the region, reflect this understanding.

The proper definition of genocide is an academic matter, and our aim is to secure tangible change, not to engage in a scholarly debate. While I disagree with the assessment that the genocide in Darfur is over (the legal definition includes intent to destroy a group), I do not wish to become enwrapped in discussion on this point. Darfur remains in a state of emergency. Calling the crisis “highly complicated, extremely brutal, low-intensity civil war” undermines its immediacy, and provides a sense that international action would be futile. Talk about misinformation!

Those living in refugee camps, like the recently attacked Kalma, may or may not have an opinion on the definition of genocide. What they do know is that murder, destruction, rape and insecurity continue to dominate their lives. Let us focus on how to help them now, and save the semantic debates for a time when the people of Darfur are able to participate.

E Greene

It is fine and easy to criticise aspects of the Darfur campaigning. But it would be better if Justin Marozzi were transparent about what his role was in Sudan. I understand that he was working in Sudan on a short assignment for Albany Associates, a public relations firm contracted to do public communications about the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) and the supposed Darfur-Darfur Dialogue for AMIS and then UNAMID. Put simply, during 2006-2008 Albany was contracted to sell the DPA and the idea of the Darfur-Darfur Dialogue. Albany, AMIS and UNAMID have therefore not been impartial on questions about the rebels' conduct: they and other backers of the DPA have clung to the easy but flawed opinion that the primary obstacle to peace in Darfur has been the rebels and their fractiousness. Mr Marozzi merely repeats this view in this article, rather than address more difficult questions, for example about whether it was right for so much effort to be made to sell a peace agreement that was all but dead at the outset in 2006, and which the Sudanese government did so little to implement during 2006-2008.