Headlines on the current discord between the United States and China speak only of ‘trade war’. Negotiations in Geneva have led to a 90 day ‘truce’. If only the war were that limited. If only agreement on solving trade hostilities would return things to normal. But what is normal?
Sadly, trade is just one aspect of a much broader war, in which neither side is contemplating a truce. The head of China’s BGI group, a former high ranking official, understands the reality better: ‘Many people talk about financial and trade wars, but the deadliest battle is the technology war. The technology war will ultimately determine the fate of both sides. Whether the US can defeat China or whether China can rise from adversity will depend on the technology war.’
But it is a broader war than finance, trade and technology. It is a war between systems, both economic and political, a war also between values, those of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and those of America (Trumpian values are a different matter). That makes it an ideological war. And it is a geopolitical war, a propaganda war (or public opinion war, as the Party’s press put it last month). Heaven forfend that it becomes a kinetic war, perhaps as a result of clashes in the South China Sea.
The CCP has been clear about this for over a decade. It uses vocabulary which in Chinese is strong: ‘struggle’ against ‘hostile foreign forces’. CCP General Secretary Xi Jinping continually repeats a theme which he set out in his very first politburo meeting: ‘We must diligently prepare for a long period of cooperation and of conflict between these two social systems in each of these domains (economic, technological, and military)… Western anti-China forces… will continue to point the spearhead of westernising, splitting, and ‘Colour Revolutions’ at China.’ The infamously leaked ‘document no. 9’ excoriated all the values upon which western systems are built. And recently the People’s Daily – a more accurate title would be the Party’s Daily – reiterated that the US has all along been attempting to contain and suppress the rise of China.
When it comes to politics, America is more of a black box than China. Long books on ‘Xi Jinping Thought’ may be dull, but they are wide-ranging and consistent. ‘Donald Trump Thought’ is disseminated in short tweets. Its coherence is less easy to absorb. Yet there is very considerable overlap between the policies of the US towards China since 2016. Bipartisan agreement on the aims is real, even if methods for achieving them might differ. No administration wants to see the CCP realising the ‘2nd Centennial Goal’, whose translation from Partyspeak would be: ‘China as the world’s superpower, and global governance supporting China’s interests and values.’
Huawei best illustrates that the issues are far wider than trade. The US had no 5G contender and it resented going in to bat for Erikson and Nokia. But it saw the technological and geopolitical threat of the CCP sitting astride western telecommunications.
It only takes one not to tango
If science and technology are the main weapons in this geopolitical and ideological struggle, the battlefield is the Global South, a concept wherein the CCP, bending geography and economics to propaganda imperatives, locates itself. The CCP is right to say that its political system cannot take root in countries with different cultures and conditions.
But the CCP is exporting elements of its systems and its values. Xi is explicit in attacking westernisation as the path for development. ‘Chinese modernisation has broken the myth of “modernisation equals westernisation”… expanding the path choices for developing countries to move towards modernisation.’ As for values, the October 2024 politburo study session on Chinese socialist culture declared that it ‘has strong ideological leadership, spiritual cohesion, value appeal, and international influence.’ If exporting its systems and values was not a major pre-occupation of the CCP, why does it spend billions on its external propaganda and united front work departments?
For third countries, neutrality in this war may not be an option. In February the White House published an ‘America First Investment Policy’. Two little noticed paragraphs talk of restrictions on foreign investors’ access being linked to ‘verifiable distance and independence from the predatory investment and technology-acquisition practices of the PRC’, as well as ‘requirements that the specified foreign investors avoid partnering with United States foreign adversaries.’ In April, Federal Communications Commission chair Brendan Carr said that Europe would have to choose between America and China. Treasury secretary Scott Bessent was more graphic: a move towards China ‘would be cutting your own throat’ – although he probably meant ‘assisted dying’.
It only takes one not to tango. But in this case neither the CCP nor America is keen to dance. The CCP has been decoupling for over a decade with its policies of self-reliance, ‘Made in China 2025’ and ‘dual circulation’ (domestic wherever possible, foreign only if necessary). America under President Trump is now more open and urgent about following suit. There are limits set by unbreakable interdependencies, but the trend is clear. It is wider than a trade war. Perhaps we should use a term such as ‘decoupling war’.
Other countries’ governments will come under increasing pressure to choose sides. They may postpone matters by doing as the UK’s government is doing: saying as little as possible about China and trying to dance with both sides. But, as often, the inventor of history, Thucydides, has lessons for us. Not the so-called ‘Thucydides claptrap’ that rising and existing powers will inevitably come to blows, but from the Melian dialogue. Big powers force small powers to choose: ‘The strong do what they can and the weak suffer what they must.’
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