There’s already quite a wide consensus around the basic assumption of the Treasury’s latest report that there would be a short-term economic shock from leaving the EU. However, it’s nigh on impossible to credibly foresee the size of this shock. And by going too far on such estimates the Treasury risks undermining the consensus already
It seems every week now there is a story about France and/or Germany ruling out EU treaty change and thereby putting pay to David Cameron’s EU reform push before it has even really begun. While this makes for good headlines, the reality is much more nuanced. Take today’s example: A leaked preliminary draft of a
David Cameron talked tough on sanctions yesterday, suggesting that he had the German and French support. I believe he means what he says and is serious about following through with sanctions. I could even be convinced that France and Germany have hardened their positions to the point where they are genuinely willing to consider ‘stage
As Peter Oborne observed on Newsnight recently, there is a tendency in the Eurozone to think its problems are political, rather than an economic crisis that cannot be wished away. For example, the Bundestag’s much vaunted approval of an expanded EFSF has done little to alleviate Europe’s weakness. Here’s why: 1) We all knew the vote would pass: the opposition support
