It is 55 years, this week, since Egyptian forces under President Nasser siezed and nationalised the Suez Canal – and triggered the eventual Suez Crisis in the process. Here is The Spectator’s leader from the time:
Safeguarding Suez, 3 August 1956
Colonel Nasser’s seizure of the Suez Canal provides a fitting climax to the disasters which have recently overtaken British policy in the Middle East. It is not the nationalisation itself that is
serious – the concession would in any case have lapsed in 1968 – but, judging by the Colonel’s speeches and the Egyptian press and radio it seems that the present Egyptian Government has decided to
ride the storm of hatred and xenophobia which were always potentially present in the fanatical and under-nourished Egyptian masses. To divert attention of a people from its own economic hardships
by abuse of some foreign country or minority is a traditional tactic of dictatorships, but the danger of it is that forces can more easily be conjured up than controlled by the demagogues that
evoke them.
It is now impossible to believe the reassuring tones of Colonel Nasser’s statement on freedom of navigation through the canal, and those who, like the Prime Minister, believed that a deal could be done with him have been decisively proved wrong. Great Britain is now in the position of having the main artery of her oil supplies dominated by an irresponsible government which has shown itself indifferent to international agreement and which is at the mercy of rabidly nationalist public opinion. This is not a situation which any power could tolerate. The Suez Canal is an international waterway. Its status is quite different from that of the Abadan oil refinery, and moreover, any attempt to use it as an integral part of the Egyptian economy would result either in essential maintenance work being neglected or else in the dues paid by shipping being raised to an extravagant level.
In the face of this threat to Western interests what action can be taken? Various economic measures have already been carried out, but their effect is problematical. The Prime Minister now seems to have resolved on a conference to discuss international control of the canal. From these discussions, so it is hoped, a scheme will be evolved which Colonel Nasser and his Government will then be asked to accept. If they do not, then presumably other action will be taken. What Sir Anthony Eden seems, in fact, to have in mind is the old nineteenth-century plan of a consensus of the powers presenting a united front in the face of an extortionate demand and ready to back their rights by military force.
The last element is, indeed, essential. In the present mood of Egyptian opinion there seems no very good reason why Colonel Nasser should give satisfaction to a mere diplomatic demarché. Even if he wanted to, it is unlikely that he could withdraw from his extreme position by making any concessions to the idea of international control. Whether military action does, in fact, take place depends in part on the American attitude. Mr. Dulles’s sudden flight to London would seem to indicate alarm in Washington over tough action by Britain and France. But the American Government should be made to understand that, even in an election year, the vital interests of Britain and France should be given at least as much consideration as, say, those of the Formosa Government.
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