‘If you want peace, destroy Hamas. If you want security, destroy Hamas. If you want a future for Israel, the Palestinians, the Middle East, destroy Hamas,’ Israel’s prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu said this week. Given its formidable military capabilities and the considerable international support it receives, Israel holds the upper hand in the ongoing war. But if the Middle East has taught us anything, it is that the notion of ‘victory’ is an elusive endeavour.
The total defeat of Hamas will be a difficult, if not impossible, task for Israel. Following the devastating terror attack on 7 October, Israel has found itself ensnared in a brutal war. But as the death toll mounts on both sides, this conflict is one that threatens to erode Israel’s own moral standing on the international stage, casting a shadow over its relationships with Arab partners and global allies alike.
Arab nations like Egypt, Jordan, the UAE, Bahrain, and Morocco, which have established diplomatic ties with Israel, find themselves in a precarious position. They endeavour to preserve peace while navigating the public outcry incited by the troubling images emerging from Gaza, all without distancing their populations or altering their policies regarding Hamas.
The struggle to annihilate Hamas is reminiscent of the global fight against Al-Qaeda
Hamas, mirroring the strategy of many militias, measures victory asymmetrically. Their success is less about combat achievements and more about enduring through conflict to maintain political influence in Gaza. Unless Hamas is completely eradicated, a highly unlikely scenario, the group will depict even a pyrrhic survival against Israel’s superior forces as a triumph.
The struggle to annihilate Hamas is reminiscent of the global fight against Al-Qaeda, highlighting the challenges of dismantling ideologically driven groups. Like Al-Qaeda, Hamas has shown resilience and adaptability, rooted in its ideological appeal and deep integration within its community. Completely eliminating Hamas, much like the ongoing battle against Al-Qaeda, may be an elusive goal given the complexities involved in confronting such entrenched ideologies. And if Hamas does manage to survive in some embryonic form, this could have a devastating impact, not only on the Palestinian territories but also on regional stability and political configuration in the Middle East.
Should Hamas avoid total eradication, its first steps could involve consolidating political and military control over Gaza and perhaps even parts of the West Bank. Historical precedents in Lebanon, where Hezbollah claimed victory in the 2006 war with Israel and later asserted dominance through force, suggest a similar trajectory may be possible for Hamas. Such a manoeuvre today, given Hamas’ diminishing approval rates, risks igniting a civil war among Palestinian groups and sending shockwaves across Jordan, Egypt, Lebanon, Syria, and beyond.
Hamas’s rule in Gaza since its 2006 electoral win has seen escalating hardships. Its fundamentalist ideology and Iran-backed agenda have been detrimental to Palestinians. Trust in Hamas is notably low, with an Arab Barometer survey revealing that 44 per cent of Gazans distrust their government completely, and another 23 per cent have little trust.
If Hamas’s survival is bad news for Palestinians, it’s good for Iran. As a principal backer of the Islamic militia, Tehran would view such an outcome as validation of its regional militarised approach and a repudiation of its adversaries’ strategies of political compromise. This could also embolden Iran’s extensive network of proxies, inspiring groups like Yemen’s Houthi or Iraqi militias to escalate their activities, possibly even into Saudi Arabia.
The Abraham Accords, celebrated as a groundbreaking shift towards cooperation between Israel and Arab nations, could also be jeopardised if Hamas isn’t defeated. A political path towards a Palestinian state would remain unattainable. Any prospect of normalising relations between Saudi Arabia and Israel, already reportedly on hold, would likely be shelved indefinitely. Furthermore, the ongoing radicalisation of Arab and Islamic public opinion could increasingly pivot from diplomatic efforts to favouring military approaches, potentially escalating extremism. A victorious Hamas could, as well, revitalise support for Islamic parties, counteracting their post-Arab Spring decline, as exemplified by the fall of Egypt’s Morsi government and the electoral defeats of Islamist parties in Tunisia and Morocco. Hamas could also potentially rekindle the prominence of Islamist ideologies and parties throughout the Middle East.
Hamas’s ultimate defeat will not come from military action alone
If Israel fails to defeat Hamas, there is another risk: a military stalemate would spell disaster for the economies of the Middle East, already reeling from the Gaza conflict. Tourism-dependent nations like Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, and the UAE are particularly vulnerable. This outcome could curtail the potential economic boost from recent Arab-Israeli, and intra-Arab diplomatic agreements and reconciliations, deterring foreign investment and stalling major international initiatives, such as the IMEC (India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor) project connecting India, the Gulf, and Europe.
Saudi Arabia’s ambitious Vision 2030, aimed at reducing the kingdom’s dependence on oil by diversifying its economy, already faces setbacks from escalating regional unrest. If a wider conflict in the Middle East breaks out, this project would be jeopardised, paving the way for more extreme ideologies to take hold in the Middle East’s future narrative.
In the scenario where Hamas avoids a clear defeat, Israel might find itself in a precarious ‘frozen conflict’, a situation it can scarcely afford. This prolonged stalemate would likely worsen the humanitarian crisis in Gaza, significantly tarnishing Israel’s global reputation. Within Israel, such a conflict would continuously threaten the security of towns close to Gaza, eroding residents’ confidence in their government’s ability to protect them. This enduring tension could also exacerbate the situation in the West Bank, potentially leading to increased unrest.
Israel can ill afford the consequences of such a frozen conflict, but there is a faint hope that the current bloody war could lead to a longer-term peace. Once Hamas’s military capabilities are neutralised, an international peacekeeping force should be deployed to maintain order and oversee the reconstruction and humanitarian aid distribution. Arab states, particularly those with peace accords with Israel, must also use their influence to aid in creating a unified Palestinian technocratic government committed to peace with Israel, and good governance for the Palestinians.
Israel also needs to undergo a radical political realignment: Netanyahu has stoked tensions and was caught napping when Hamas carried out its raid. Israel’s prime minister has opted for illusionary political tactics to navigate the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, rather than earnestly pursuing its resolution. It’s vital that a different approach is adopted by whoever replaces Israel’s leader.
For now, Netanyahu will remain in power – determined to achieve his aim of destroying Hamas. Despite the success of Israel’s military operation so far, eradicating this group will be much harder than his rhetoric suggests. The most dangerous situation is one in which Hamas survives in some form and manages to regroup, and maintain its ability to influence the political discourse of the Palestinians. This would be disastrous for both Israelis and Palestinians, making the prospect of lasting peace in the Middle East remote. But to convince Palestinians that supporting Hamas is a bad idea, Israel and Palestine’s leadership must work together to give people hope: both that the horrendous terror attacks of 7 October will never happen again, and also that a two-state solution is possible.
Hamas’s ultimate defeat will not come from military action alone, but rather from a shift in Palestinian perspectives towards embracing political dialogue and compromise. This change, hinges on Israel, Arabs and international community convincing Palestinians of the feasibility, nearness and sustainability of a two-state solution.
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