‘What is to stop it happening again?’ was the pertinent question put to me by a Lebanese friend this week as we discussed over a mezze the announcement of a ceasefire between Israel and Hezbollah. Given what we know of the terms agreed between the combatants, the answer seems to be, ‘Not a lot.’ Generally, I am not one to pour cold water or see the glass half empty. But beyond welcoming a cessation in the brutal meeting out of death by bombardment on the civilians in both Lebanon and northern Israel, it is hard to see the ceasefire agreement as sustainable in the long term.
Since Hezbollah weighed in quickly to support Hamas and attack northern Israel after the atrocities of 7 October, it was always a question of when and how Prime Minister Netanyahu’s government would respond. The war aims he laid down on 1 October when the Israeli Defence Forces eventually invaded southern Lebanon to drive back Hezbollah fighters were less ambitious than those set out for the conflict against Hamas. When Netanyahu claimed that Israel’s objectives had been achieved and said he was drawing a line under the current offensive, he at the same time threatened ‘intensive war’ if the ceasefire was violated. The Lebanese army have already accused Israel of violating the ceasefire several times. This is a fragile peace.
The conflict with Hezbollah of the last three months was the fifth Israeli invasion of Lebanon since 1978. In the last year, at least 3,823 Lebanese civilians have been killed and a further 15,859 injured, according to official statistics. The recently appointed head of United Nations humanitarian work, my former colleague Tom Fletcher – no longer the ‘Naked Diplomat’ (the title of his book) but now fetchingly clad in the sky-blue body armour of the UN – describes the situation in Lebanon as the ‘most devastating humanitarian crisis in a generation.’ Fletcher continues, ‘This ceasefire is our greatest hope for bringing an end to the immense suffering.’ I hope he is right, but fear over-optimism.
There may be ways to improve on the all-too apparent shortcomings of the ceasefire
The problem is that the ceasefire simply puts a sticking plaster on a festering wound. Hezbollah survives to fight another day and does not even seem to be required to give up its arms, under the terms bartered by the US and its Arab negotiating partners. Of course, there may be elements to the ceasefire that are not public – such as assurances reportedly given in a side letter to Netanyahu. But on the face of it, the ceasefire is not sustainable. Its Achilles heel which will become apparent again in due course, whether in weeks, months or years, is that the Lebanese state is in no position to remove Hezbollah from its dominant military and political role in the country. That means that the Islamic Republic of Iran, which created, built up and sustains Hezbollah, will continue to have the means to exert pressure directly onto Israel from its northern neighbour as part of its Forward Defence doctrine.
It is not unfair to ask why the millions of peaceful Lebanese who loathe Hezbollah are unable to lance the boil within their society. Well, because the country’s constitution is simply not fit for purpose. Under the National Pact of 1943, the constitution lays down a division of powers between the three main religious communities of Lebanon: the president must be a Maronite Christian, the prime minister a Sunni Muslim and the speaker of parliament a Shia Muslim. This distribution of power also applies at local levels of government. The divisions built into the political system and consequent corruption, economic failure and ungovernability of Lebanon, have played into Hezbollah’s hands. Normal citizens are long frustrated by the reality of living in a failed state that seemingly has no hope of repairing. The plan to appoint a new president on 9 January after a two-year gap, which some Lebanese consider will help stabilise the country, seems highly unlikely to solve the fundamental issues. Even if the role goes to an experienced operator, such as General Aoun commander of the armed forces, apparently backed by the US and France.
Beyond a more workable constitution, Lebanon needs a permanent and sustainable ceasefire – not a temporary hiatus between conflicts – to have any chance of getting out of the tragic rut in which it has languished since the civil war half a century ago. But to achieve that requires full implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1701 and previous resolutions 1680 and 1559. UNSCR 1701 – agreed at the end of the 2006 conflict, but markedly ignored by both parties thereafter – is the basis for the latest ceasefire. The US will lead a monitoring mission to oversee implementation, such as the Lebanese army taking over security south of the Litani river and Hezbollah withdrawal north of that. But – given Hezbollah’s continued grip on arms and power and absent a proper peace agreement between Lebanon and Israel looking to a different future – it is hard to see implementation of 1701 being any more successful this time than during the last 18 years.
There may be ways to mitigate and even improve on the all-too apparent shortcomings of the ceasefire. While the US has clearly played a significant role in convincing Netanyahu that this was the right moment to draw stumps, not least with a presidential transition ongoing, other global and regional powers could step up helpfully at this point. France, which issued a joint statement with the US on the ceasefire, is the former colonial power and President Macron has visited twice recently and tried to position France as the key peacemaker and closest ally of the Lebanese people. But a former senior French diplomat told me that ‘France is out, despite the official statements.’ The French government has made a U-turn on whether Netanyahu would risk arrest if he visited France as an ICC-indicted war criminal – presumably part of the price demanded by the Israeli prime minister to sign up to the ceasefire. The US can only do so much alone and will hardly be seen as an impartial or even-handed arbiter given its ties to Tel Aviv.
That reality might provide an opportunity for the one other western power with deep recent experience of the region to do a bit more to make the ceasefire stick. Among the permanent members of the Security Council, the UK retains a rare ability to convene hostile actors and broker political processes and solutions. Despite its many, sometimes justified, detractors, the UK can add value in Lebanon today, just as it did at key moments on Yemen and Libya since 2011. Doing so would benefit UK security and prosperity, as well as boosting our influence.
Of course, this would require the British government and the Foreign Office in particular, to reanimate its foreign policy and remember how it has succeeded in the past: it would need to rediscover the sadly mislaid mojo of its once vaunted Diplomatic Service and be prepared once again for the challenges of Expeditionary Diplomacy; also to recall that the justification for King Charles Street’s existence, with its impressive global network of embassies, is to serve the national interest, not chip away at a list of vague thematics. British foreign policy, as Palmerston identified almost two centuries ago, should be primarily about the country’s interests.
Chimeric and eye wateringly expensive aspirations to make the world a better place should be a natural consequence and function of a clear-eyed pursuit of the national interest, not the drivers of foreign policy. The FCDO exists to serve and prioritise the interests of the people of the United Kingdom, not of the global population, though they are rarely mutually exclusive. Readers may wonder why something so evident needs stating? They should be aware that some more progressive-minded may have taken a sharp intake of breath and found offensive the bold affrontery of asserting the national interest.
If willing to rise to the challenge and take on a more central role, what might the UK do? Play to its strengths and leverage its relationships, surprise those allies who while retaining respect for UK diplomacy are repeatedly perplexed and disappointed by the below-par performance and absences of recent years. The UK could start by taking the initiative to bring together in a political dialogue the US, France and Saudi Arabia (the increasingly evident Arab regional power) that might then lead the international community in supporting the Lebanese people. The process might review and revise their failed constitution to allow the people to remove armed militias from everyday life in Lebanon. That would allow a different relationship with the southern neighbour Israel and help stabilise the region.
As a corollary to a political process, investment from the Gulf, US and Europe is desperately needed to underpin a long term peace. The UK could help galvanise and focus this to ensure money goes where it has most positive impact. If the factions recognised that it is in their financial self interest to work together to rebuild Lebanon, then the chances of real and lasting change would increase.
As always in such uncertain times there are wild cards and unpredictable actors. How the incoming US president decides to engage the Netanyahu government and its enemies will determine, fairly rapidly I suspect, the prospects for fashioning and incubating a sustainable ceasefire and peace between Lebanon and Israel. But, also, how Iran now decides to respond to the new dynamic will be important. Tehran has made clear its support for the ceasefire – no surprise there, given that continuing conflict in Lebanon risked degrading further its most prized proxy Hezbollah and fueling its own direct conflict with Israel.
The Islamic Republic needs to decide whether it still must respond to the last tit for tat attack by Israel a month ago, which damaged its air defence systems. Doing so would put the ball back in Israel’s court. If – and it is a big if – backed by an incoming, fiercely anti-Iranian US President, Netanyahu might decide to take the fight to Iran and target its nuclear facilities in a new way. The chances of the Lebanon ceasefire surviving such an escalation would appear to be slight. Meanwhile, Iranian diplomacy is in overdrive rebuilding its standing and relationships in the region. Foreign minister Araghchi has been making overtures in Egypt, Algeria and Saudi Arabia, while his deputy, Ravanchi, this weekend held direct talks with European powers about possible new negotiations for a nuclear freeze in exchange for an easing of sanctions. e
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