A well-calculated risk

Sir John Keegan’s account of the origins and conduct of the war in Iraq is at once striking for its succinctness. In a comfortable but pacey afternoon and evening’s read we have the long cultural and historical background to the region’s instability, the course and legacy of the 1991 Gulf war, the diplomatic build-up to war last year, the campaign itself, and the aftermath. It is a remarkable achievement, and one that the author himself at first doubted was possible in the timeframe. But Keegan’s editor at Hutchinson, Anthony Whittome, persuaded him that, once begun, the difficulties would dissolve. This conviction, that the story is essentially straightforward, before the fighting, during and after, Keegan demonstrates in masterly and often bravura fashion. His first words set the tone: ‘Some wars begin badly. Some end badly. The Iraq war of 2003 was exceptional in both beginning well for the Anglo-American force that waged it and ending victoriously.’

Keegan has never wavered in his support for the war. A devout Catholic, he is convinced from a moral, legal and pragmatic standpoint, and it shows. Having stated the facts, he gives his opinions decidedly: ‘He [Saddam] declined to offer the facilities and guarantees that would have staved off the consequences of his intransigence. He thus brought war on himself.’ But Keegan is never party, only intellectually convinced in a regretfully Hobbesian way. Not all military truth is revealed, as well as diplomatic, and he admits to having been mystified by much both before and during the war, which he covered day by day from London for the Daily Telegraph. But he is held in high regard by the MoD establishment, especially the army. It goes back to his days as a lecturer at Sandhurst: most senior officers have learned something of their profession at his hands, and they are always willing to talk.