Banning Iran’s IRGC makes more sense than cracking down on Wagner

Is the Wagner Group a terror threat to Britain? Until this morning, the thought had probably never occurred to most people as they went about their lives. The mercenary group has indeed done terrible things in Ukraine and Africa. But a threat to British subjects on our own soil?

Today, however, the government will add Wagner to its list of proscribed organisations, which includes groups like Islamic State and al-Qaeda. This means that joining or supporting the organisation carries a penalty of up to 14 years in prison. Officials will be able to seize Wagner’s assets more easily, and members of the group will be barred from silencing journalists and campaigners in British courts.

The move was unprecedented because Wagner is in effect an arm of the Russian state. In July, Putin admitted that it was fully funded by the Kremlin, receiving tens of billions of roubles this year. Wagner had previously retained the veneer of being a private army; in the summer, Putin also revealed that Wagner mercenaries had been invited to sign contracts with his defence ministry.

So far so good. Given the behaviour of Putin – who is forming a fresh military alliance with North Korea as he continues to prosecute his appalling war – Britain’s decisive move will reassure Ukraine’s president Zelensky that we are in it to win it. Given the scepticism towards his cause among presidential hopefuls in the United States, this is important. 

It is hard to escape the impression, however, that proscription is being used in the service of political and diplomatic aims, rather than those of national security. I’m not suggesting that Wagner presents no threats to our citizens at home, but it is certainly not top of the list of concerns that keep security officials up at night. 

Indeed, the threat that does keep them tossing and turning comes from a different source. One domestic security official told me: ‘The one issue that really stops me sleeping is Iran. If you knew what I know, it would stop you sleeping as well.’

For months, efforts have been underway to persuade the Foreign Office to accept the addition of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) to the terror list. There are far more compelling reasons to proscribe this disturbing organisation than the Wagner Group. Yet the foreign secretary, James Cleverley, has been turning a deaf ear.

For years, IRGC thugs have intimidated, bullied and threatened dissidents in Britain, on some occasions with guns. But it doesn’t stop there. Last year, the director general of MI5 revealed that the IRGC had attempted to assassinate British residents 10 times in 2022. In his annual speech on the threats facing the UK, Ken McCallum said Iran’s ‘aggressive intelligence services’ had crossed over into launching terrorist attacks on British soil.

Iran was the ‘state actor which most frequently crosses into terrorism’, he added, branding Tehran’s intelligence services ‘a sophisticated adversary’. He concluded:

‘Iran projects threat to the UK directly, through its aggressive intelligence services. At its sharpest, this includes ambitions to kidnap or even kill British or UK-based individuals perceived as enemies of the regime.’

In February, Matt Jukes, head of counter-terrorism policing at the Met, disclosed that police and security services had foiled 15 abduction and murder plots by the IRGC. Hours before, a London-based Iranian broadcaster which opposes the Tehran regime was forced to move its operations to the United States – where the IRGC is proscribed as a terror group – amid mounting safety concerns in Britain. 

Earlier this year, the Jewish Chronicle revealed that Iran was ‘mapping’ prominent Jews in Britain and elsewhere in the west for potential assassination, in order to create leverage against Israel. This was confirmed by the security minister, Tom Tugendhat, who told parliament in an urgent statement:

‘Between 2020 and 2022, Iran tried to collect intelligence on UK-based Israeli and Jewish individuals. We believe this information was a preparation for future lethal operations.’

‘The IRGC should be a proscribed organisation under our counter terrorist legislation,’ former MI6 chief Richard Dearlove has said. Yet James Cleverly has failed to support any decisive action.

The Foreign Office’s reasoning is clear, if rather mealy-mouthed. Diplomats fret that Tehran would retaliate by closing Britain’s embassy in the city, which would compromise our diplomacy and espionage operations. 

They worry that although such action would align us with the United States, it would set us at odds with our European allies, allowing Iran to drive a wedge between us. Britain has been the most hawkish voice in the nuclear negotiations; this influence, they fear, would be lost, as proscribing the IRGC would make Iran unwilling to include us in future talks.

Above all, they have been concerned that proscribing a state entity will set a precedent, allowing campaigners to agitate for proscription of friendly democracies like Israel, which is despised by so many on the Israelophobic left. Well, the Wagner proscription has shown that they can broach that precedent when they want to.

The Foreign Office’s logic has always felt flimsy. But given the alacrity with which it has rubber stamped the Wagner Group’s proscription today, it seems hypocritical too. 

The nuclear negotiations are dead. If closing our embassy would be such a significant blow, it says uncomfortable things about the limits of our operations overseas. And our reluctance to break from European diplomatic orthodoxy suggests an instinct towards following the herd, rather than showing British leadership. How can James Cleverley endorse the proscription of a more minor threat while ignoring the most serious one?

Allowing the IRGC to avoid the terror list makes it much more difficult to keep Britons safe, as it actively inhibits law enforcement. For instance, Alicia Kearns, chair of the Foreign Affairs Committee, has called for the IRGC’s centres in Maida Vale and elsewhere to be closed down permanently. Existing legal instruments are proving insufficient to accomplish this.

It is important to emphasise the strength of political support that is behind the campaign to proscribe the Iranian organisation. ‘Parliament seems united in its view that time has come to proscribe the IRGC,’ Kearns tweeted in January. ‘It would mark a step change in our counter terrorism policy, recognising for the first time that a state can be culpable of terrorism, and not just hostile state activity. But would be (the) right action.’ 

If parliament is united, how can the Foreign Office continue to justify standing in its way? Clearly, it can act decisively when diplomatic goals are on the horizon. National security goals, not so much.

Israelophobia: The newest version of the oldest hatred, by Jake Wallis Simons (Constable, £12.99), is out on 7 September and can be pre-ordered now.