How to explain Israel’s intelligence and military failure? The obvious comparison – one Israelis themselves are making – is with the 1973 October War, when the country was sucker-punched by Egyptian and Syrian forces on Yom Kippur, the Day of Repentance. That became known as a failing of the konzeptzia, the Hebrew term for the way we frame the world with all its attendant risks. It seems to have happened again.
In the West, Israel is generally seen as either admirably or reprehensibly tough-minded, taking the hardest line against its enemies whatever the circumstances and punching back twice as hard. The trouble is, it’s not at all clear that this is true – now at least.
Israeli prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu talks tough. But if you look at the way he has handled the Iran file, for example, he has been extremely cautious, authorising air strikes against IRGC (Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps) positions in Syria and Lebanon, but taking care not to provoke Hezbollah – and relying on clandestine rather than overt activity inside Iran itself.
Too many people seem to have persuaded themselves that Hamas was open to negotiations
Israel’s recent domestic turmoil, over the coalition government’s approach to judicial and legal reform, has, of course, taken up much of the available political oxygen for months. But both Netanyahu and many others within Israel’s national security establishment seem to have come to believe that Hamas could be contained. The organisation was primarily interested in consolidating its position inside Gaza. Its ultimate goal may have been to take over the West Bank and displace Fatah as the predominant force in Palestinian politics. But that was a problem for another day. Its access to Qatari cash and mediation, and its long-standing working relations with Egypt and Turkey gave it something to lose and brought a welcome degree of predictability.
From time to time, when Hamas decided it needed to flex its muscles by firing rockets in a display of performative aggression, Iron Dome was there to intercept them. More or less everyone went home happy. Just as in Northern Ireland, where Sinn Fein and the IRA were seen as the best bulwark against dissident republicans, so Hamas could act as a bulwark against Al-Qaeda, Islamic State and Palestinian Islamic Jihad.
Allowing Hamas to build its own state with Gulf cash, PA transfers and revenue from employment in Israel, the theory went, might bring a sense of responsibility. It would also make it wary, at least in public, of taking too Iranian – that is bellicose – a line on general issues of Palestinian liberation. And the judicious adjustment of economic safety valves would regulate any incentives to seek Iranian cash. This month, for example, Israel re-issued permits and reopened the Erez Crossing to almost 18,000 Palestinian workers, a reward for an understanding that Hamas would reduce friction, such as recent ‘civilian’ border protests.
How illusory this all now appears. These protests, it turns out, were not simply a spectacle. They were a test of security and therefore an integral part of the preparations for Saturday’s operation. Iran may have been consulted in advance and have provided some advice and resources. Hamas will have taken lessons from previous Hezbollah operations, particularly those designed to infiltrate Israel and seize hostages. But Hamas will have planned the exact course of the violence – the targeting of civilians, including women and children, the desecration of corpses, the cold-blooded mass murder – all by itself. And it has taken a leaf out of Da’esh’s book by filming every horror and then broadcasting the footage on social media.
Too many people seem to have persuaded themselves that Hamas was open to negotiations, and – a recurring dream – might be willing to accept a long-term ceasefire (hudna) in return for guarantees of economic easing. This meant ignoring its adamantine ideology, even if a statement of general principles, toning down the virulent and genocidal anti-Semitism of its 1988 Charter – but not abrogating it – was published for western consumption in 2017. These illusions have been shared by some British and American officials and commentators, who have sought to push Israel towards acceptance and conciliation.
Israel has for years facilitated the delivery inside Gaza of humanitarian aid from international relief agencies and NGOs, whose standard response at times of conflict is to urge Israel to end military action against terrorists who shelter among civilians and in the basements of crowded blocks of flats or hospitals. They even allowed Qatar, who we at Policy Exchange described as a ‘frenemy’ of Britain in a report last year, to send over a billion dollars of assistance as part of a package of relief measures. This money has simply enabled Hamas to evade its own responsibilities to the people of Gaza and continue to build its military capabilities.
There appear to be no examples of engagement with Islamists that have led to a positive change in that organisation’s behaviour. Usually the reverse is true. That remains the case today.
Islamism, of course, is not a uniform entity, any more than communism was. And even within organisations like Hamas, which is ethno-nationalist as well as Islamist, there are different trends, as there were in the Comintern. But there are certain ideological basics, for example constitutive anti-Semitism, misogyny, religious supremacism and a belief that extreme violence in God’s name can be Islamically justified, that should be anathema in a liberal, secular society. As it threatens to film executions of its hostages, Hamas needs to be seen for what it is – a globally-connected group of brutal mujahidin in control of the Islamist Emirate of Gaza.
There are also lessons here for Britain. The European Union announced it will immediately review its development funding programmes in the West Bank and Gaza (even if there was some confusion about whether it was backtracking). The Foreign Office should do the same. The aim is not to stop helping Palestinians. It is to make sure that Hamas as an organisation does not benefit. The Foreign Office has allocated £17 million in development funding for Palestine in this financial year, which is set to rise to £29 million in 2024-5. We need a quick and thorough assessment of who exactly the recipients of that money are. Hamas have more than enough already for their own purposes. They do not need British taxpayers to give them any more.
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