Paul Collier, the noted Oxford economist who used to be at the World Bank, has a thought-provoking piece in The Washington Post today arguing that the best, realistic solution to problems like Zimbabwe is a coup. Here’s the nub of his argument:
So how can the grossly excessive powers of the Mugabes and Shwes of the world be curtailed? After Iraq, there is no international appetite for using the threat of military force to pressure thugs. But only military pressure is likely to be effective; tyrants can almost always shield themselves from economic sanctions. So there is only one credible counter to dictatorial power: the country’s own army.
Realistically, Mugabe and Shwe can be toppled only by a military coup. Of course, they are fully aware of this danger, and thus have appointed their cronies as generals and kept a watchful eye on any potentially restless junior officers. Such tactics reduce the risk of a coup, but they cannot eliminate it: On average, there have been two successful coups per year in the developing world in recent decades. A truly bad government in a developing country is more likely to be replaced by a coup than by an election:
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In contexts such as Zimbabwe and Burma, coups should be encouraged because they are likely to lead to improved governance. (It’s hard to imagine things getting much worse.)
Collier thinks that what the international community has to work out is some way to guide coups, to create an international trigger mechanism for them. Collier accepts that the United Nations is not likely to be much use in this regard; too many dictatorial regimes would be wary of the precedent it would set. So he suggests that the EU should withdraw recognition from regimes that breach certain basic norms for three months at a time, to provide a window of opportunity for action.
Obviously, a coup is far from ideal solution. Once a country—and particularly, its military—develops this habit it is very hard to break out of it. But in both Zimbabwe and Burma there is no international appetite for intervention and the regimes have such little contempt for the welfare of their own citizens that economic sanctions are not that effective. One wonders what other potential solutions there are.
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