It was never just about Gaza. Since October, the Middle East has been in a regional war that, over the next few weeks, is likely to break into the open. After Israel’s airstrike on Beirut and assassination of Hamas chief Ismail Haniyeh in Tehran last week, Iran is promising a different approach. Following the killing of Qassem Soleimani in 2020, and the Israeli attack on Iran’s consulate in Damascus, they promised enteqam: revenge. Today, they say mojazat – punishment, or khun-khahi: literally ‘a desire for blood’.
Israel has three outstanding blood debts accumulated over the past few weeks from across the self-styled ‘Axis of Resistance’. It bombed Hodeidah, the Houthi-controlled port in Yemen, in broad daylight. It killed a top Hezbollah commander – who was also wanted by the United States for the 1983 Beirut bombings – in the middle of Hezbollah’s Beirut stronghold. It humiliated the Iranian regime by assassinating the political chairman of Hamas, hours after he hugged and kissed the Supreme Leader. The response will be coordinated such that all three bereaved parties can get payback either together, or one after the other.
August is the ideal time for Netanyahu to go to the brink and possibly even beyond
The Axis could delay a serious attack until 13 August, which coincides with the Ninth of Av: a date in the Jewish calendar that has for millennia been synonymous with tragedy. It is the date on which the Romans expelled the Jews from Israel in 70 CE; the day that Jews were expelled from England in 1290; the day the Warsaw Ghetto was liquidated in 1942. Israel’s enemies know all about it. Last year, Iranian hardliners made a short documentary about the day and in 1994, Hezbollah picked the date to blow up a Jewish community centre in Argentina in Buenos Aires, killing 85 people.
What matters more than when, however, is what. The way the Axis chooses to retaliate will answer the most important question of all: when it comes to withstanding the consequences of their attacks on Axis targets, has Israel been bluffing?
The Axis could assume that Israel has bitten off more than it can chew. It could drag Israel into a second war of attrition in Lebanon, which would be far more punishing for the Israeli home front than Gaza. Other factions of the Axis could wear out Israel’s air defences. Before long, Israel would return to the sluggish momentum of the last few months. Morale would be sapped, and the White House would quickly come under heavy pressure to push for a ceasefire. Iran could even use the chaos to finally build a nuclear bomb.
The other option for the Axis is to gamble that America intervenes to ‘bear hug’ Israel. Since October, forward deployments of American assets to the Middle East have done less to deter Iran than to restrain Israel. US pressure likely stopped Israeli prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu from going to war in Lebanon in October, and prevented a significant Israeli response to Iran’s last missile attack in April. The Axis may opt for an attack where the stakes are either too high or too low to justify a full-scale regional war, betting on Washington to once again hold Israel back. But what if Israel’s presentation of might is not a bluff at all?
For months, observers of the Middle East have grown accustomed to a grinding war of attrition conducted within limited parameters. A ceasefire has proven elusive since November. It finally appeared close as Israel grew tired, creaking under the strain of domestic unrest and American pressure. Many assumed was that Israel was not ready for war. Its reservists were worn out, it faced a critical shortage of munitions, and had lost American backing. Those assumptions must now be put in question.
Israel may have just decided to rip off the plaster. Contrary to popular belief, Netanyahu is not beholden to extremists in this moment. He has more political freedom than he has had in a year. The Knesset is on summer break, meaning a vote of no confidence cannot be called against him until late October. Until then, he is in total control. His real deadline is 5 November when America heads to the polls.
So August is the ideal time for Netanyahu to go to the brink – and possibly even beyond. An off-ramp in the conflict could come in September. October will ideally be quiet enough, just in time for the Jewish high holidays, the return of the Knesset, and the US election.
The question now is whether Israel will enter a second war – with Lebanon – or a third with Iran. Israel crossed all of Hezbollah’s red lines when it hit Beirut and killed a top Hezbollah commander. Hezbollah now has no choice but to attack at least one major Israeli city. Israel will then retaliate again, and so forth. It is hard to see how this ends otherwise.
In his speech last Thursday, Hezbollah secretary-general Hassan Nasrallah said that Israel’s hit on Haniyeh was an ‘attack on Iran’s sovereignty, national security, prestige and honour’. However, Iran’s options are more complicated. The Islamic Republic faces numerous problems: high inflation, high unemployment, restive minorities, endemic corruption and, as is now clear to all, a compromised inner circle. The one area in which it excels is opportunistic empire-building. If this fails, the regime could be at risk.
Iran has a long-standing plan to boot the United States out of the Middle East (as Policy Exchange observed in ‘The Iran Question and British Strategy’) and to make Israel unliveable. Until now, the plan has worked. Tehran has been the greatest beneficiary of the Middle East’s chaos. It now has a choice to make: if it does not go far enough, it risks internal infighting. If it goes too far, it could turn Joe Biden into Jimmy Carter, putting Donald Trump back into office – or pushing Netanyahu to fulfil what he seems to consider his destiny: destroying the nuclear program.
Last week, against this volatile backdrop, senior British officials met with their Israeli counterparts. The irony is that the meeting comes a week after the British government dropped its opposition to a possible International Criminal Court arrest warrant for Israel’s leadership on war crimes charges. As the stakes grow higher in the Middle East’s crisis, the UK has to ask serious questions about its interests in the region – and how best to reflect those interests in terms of policy. 7 October shattered the region’s balance of power. For months, it has tilted in Iran’s favour, but it is now again in play.
Iran and Hezbollah will launch massive barrages of missiles in the coming weeks. The real moment of truth for the region will, however, emerge from the aftermath.
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