The Nato meeting of defence ministers in Brussels today will give its participants an opportunity to discuss the issues facing the alliance in perhaps a more cordial, if frank, manner before the inevitably more theatrical leaders’ summit in The Hague at the end of the month. Much of the focus will be on proposed defence expenditure increases, not least in Britain, where following the publication of the government’s Strategic Defence Review (SDR) this week there were suggestions that Nato would ‘force’ Keir Starmer to raise defence spending to 3.5 per cent of GDP. Next week’s spending review should cast light on how feasible this is, given current plans to reach 2.5 per cent by 2027.
At the same time, Europe is bracing for a diplomatic rollercoaster of a month. Overlapping discussions with the US on security, Ukraine and EU-US trade are leaving leaders worrying about their exposure to the whims of Donald Trump’s administration.
At its worst, the emergence of an EU alternative would undermine Nato
For Britain, there are challenges and opportunities. This week’s SDR paints a sombre, if useful, picture of the gaps in the country’s defence capabilities and rightly highlights the need for the total reform of defence procurement. Typically, though, it remains light on detail.
While the SDR makes clear that investing in new capabilities is urgent, it is a shame that there is no acknowledgement of the wider set of self-inflicted policy choices that have constrained British (and European) defence. From net zero targets that contribute to our high industrial energy prices, to the environmental governance regimes that prevent capital from being invested in promising defence start-ups, so much of Britain’s defence industrial malaise could be fixed with the right political will.
Another risk to Britain is the potential friction between the government’s commitment to a ‘Nato first’ policy and its much-vaunted but quickly forgotten UK-EU security partnership. Signed only a few weeks ago as part of Labour’s desire to ‘reset’ relations with the EU, the pact could prove to be a strategic miscalculation with profound consequences for British and European security.
For decades, the EU has been pushing for the creation of a European defence union to achieve strategic autonomy, a process that has been considerably expedited in response to Brexit, the war in Ukraine, and the current signals from the Trump administration of a desire to pivot American resources to the Indo-Pacific. While Europe committing greater resources to defence is vital, the strengthening of our collective security and encouraging the emergence of a specific EU defence that would compete with Nato are entirely separate objectives, the latter of which does not suit British interests.
At its worst, the emergence of an EU alternative would undermine Nato, the cornerstone of British security. Even pursuing EU defence initiatives would divert precious resources and personnel away from the alliance and national defence – as Nato Secretary General Mark Rutte warned when he called for the continent to ‘avoid duplicating existing structures’. ‘We cannot afford to waste time and resources,’ he added. Creating alternative EU defence standards is at best duplicative, and precisely the type of bureaucratic burden that needs to go.
Given the restrictions Brussels places on third-party control of intellectual property rights and export controls, getting entangled in the EU’s defence industrial aspirations would also harm British defence companies. Why should the defence industry face restrictions on working with other Nato allies such as the US and Turkey – not to mention further afield – because of EU protectionism?
Unfortunately, the government’s security partnership with the EU has amounted to little more than accepting a formalisation of the UK-EU defence relationship. It serves only to tacitly encourage EU defence initiatives with no clear upside for Britain. The UK’s commitment to Ukraine and its active involvement in European security from the Baltic to the Balkans had before that been conducted through ad hoc cooperation with Brussels, affording London flexibility while safeguarding its defence sovereignty. British access to the EU’s £150 billion loan scheme for defence projects, one of the primary reasons for the government’s decision to formalise relations, has also failed to materialise. This is thanks to the EU’s demand that Britain sign additional administrative agreements.
This ratcheting up of demands requiring Britain to make greater concessions to the EU to achieve the same outcomes does not bode well for our country’s security or sovereignty. Each round of negotiations gives EU member states the opportunity to add more demands. Britain should have walked when French demands for fishing access became ‘inseparable’ from discussions on defence. All this did was expose the fundamental unseriousness of the EU as a geopolitical entity and the risks of British entanglement.
Instead, Britain should take a more assertive approach to European defence, working bilaterally and deprioritising those who throw up barriers to cooperation. Despite admittedly weakened defence capabilities, Britain is still in a class above its allies on the continent, who, anxious about current relations with the US, will look to these isles to do more.
To lead in Europe, Britain must be prepared to vigorously oppose initiatives that run contrary to its security interests. This starts with the unhelpful sideshow that is EU defence. This is the message the Prime Minister should deliver to Europe at this month’s Nato summit.
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