‘What happens next?’ is the worried question I keep getting from Indian and Pakistani friends as military exchanges between the two countries continue.
The current crisis was eminently predictable – in nature, if not in timing – as terrorist incidents persisted, albeit at lower levels, in Kashmir and given relations between India and Pakistan were so poor. Both countries had long signalled their approach and rehearsed it during crises in 2016 and 2019. India had made clear that it would respond to significant terrorist incidents with kinetic actions at a time and in a manner of their choosing. Pakistan’s military and political leadership were equally forthright: if India did so, Pakistan would respond in kind – and then some. The question wasn’t whether the next major incident would see a crisis, but what form any de-escalation or off-ramp might take.
The trigger this time was a brutal terrorist attack in the Pahalgam in the Kashmir Valley that killed 26, primarily Indian tourists. The attacks were captured on social media providing haunting, visceral content of holidaymakers being gunned down. The location had a poignant echo of past attacks, including a terrorist abduction and killing of five foreign tourists in July 1995, which included two Britons.
The latest attacks have left India horrified, furious, and frustrated. It blames Pakistan for continuing to harbour and support a terrorist infrastructure that it argues is used to support attacks against India. Coming on top of numerous past incidents, including the notorious 2008 Mumbai terrorist attacks, Indian public opinion wants to put an end to this. India says Pakistan-based terrorist networks were responsible for the attack, with reports suggesting two of the attackers were Pashtu-speaking. One may even be a former Pakistani commando.
Outrage was amplified by social media. Distressing video emerged of the moment terrorists started shooting tourists from all across India. On 7 May came India’s response: Operation Sindoor, named after the vermillion mark Hindu women use when married. The name reflected an iconic image from the attack showing Himanshi Narwal sitting by the body of her husband, Lt Vinay Narwal, an Indian Navy officer and one of those killed. India launched military strikes against targets it identified as terrorist sites: in Muzaffarabad and Kotli in Pakistani-administered Kashmir, and in Pakistan’s Punjab province.
The strikes came after an intense diplomatic barrage: aimed primarily at Pakistan and signalling the seriousness with which Delhi viewed the attack. The international goal was not to seek endorsement or permission, but to position India’s responses. Bilaterally, India suspended the Indus Waters Treaty, a 1960 agreement brokered by the World Bank that governs water-sharing between the two countries.
Pakistan, highly dependent on the water flow from upstream rivers, has long argued that upending the treaty would be tantamount to an act of war. India suspended trade, visas and overflights by Pakistani airlines. It expelled Pakistan’s military diplomats from New Delhi and withdrew its own from Islamabad. Both High Commissions are currently led by Chargé d’Affaires since an earlier deterioration in 2019 over a change India made to Kashmir’s political status. India’s Prime Minister Narendra Modi announced that ‘every terrorist and their backers’ would be punished.
The Line of Control in Kashmir dividing the Indian and Pakistani-administered zones of the contested state lit up with small arms exchanges. However, neither side has formally renounced the Line of Control Ceasefire, a key confidence-building measure first agreed in 2003 and renewed in 2021. Both states have nuclear weapons and good reason to maintain strategic stability. But here lies the paradox: nuclear weapons, some argue, has also empowered higher risk activities under the nuclear umbrella.
The key decision-makers on what happens next are Modi in India, his National Security Adviser Ajit Doval and Foreign Minister Subrahmanyam Jaishankar. Doval, a security official with deep counter-terrorism experience, is applying his thinking on defensive offence to Indian security policy. His goal is to increase the costs for those involved in major terrorist incidents. In Pakistan, General Asim Munir, Chief of Army Staff since 2022, is in the hot-seat. Shebaz Sharif, Pakistan’s democratically elected Prime Minister, is not the main mover on security policy. General Munir has reprised Pakistan’s historic stance on Kashmir, describing it as the ‘jugular vein’ of Pakistan. His rhetoric is a departure from the nuanced language of his predecessor.
Nearly eight decades since 1947, instability appears to be a feature, not a bug, of Pakistan’s relations with India
The two countries have differing trajectories and interests. There is no meeting of minds on their dispute over Kashmir (unfinished business, according to Pakistan; not so, says India) or on many other issues. India’s growing status and strength underpins some of its frustration with Pakistan. India’s economy is so far beyond that of Pakistan – still reliant on regular IMF bailouts – that it is now over ten times larger than Pakistan’s. In New Delhi, China, not Pakistan, is the priority. When there in December, the prevailing dinner party chatter was about technology, China-US relations and the international role of India. Pakistan was ghosted.
And Pakistan has fewer cards to play. It is less strategically important than before the fall of Kabul. A close partner of China, it remains dependent on economic support from outside. Nuclear weapons may provide a degree of power-matching, but emerging technologies and India’s massive military advantage risk degrading Pakistan’s command and control. This has Pakistani generals worrying, including about a potential Indian strike to eliminate Pakistan’s nuclear weapons. Nuclear experts run this down. Being able to do so with high-confidence is most unlikely – a deterrent for Pakistan’s nuclear deterrent.
The big question now is what an off-ramp might be. Both sides need to claim victory – or at least maintain face – in a testy social media environment. A return to managed hostility may be the best that can be hoped for, but the challenge is how. No sudden-onset breakthrough seems likely. The relationship is low on trust, with Pakistan also claiming that India is interfering in the restive province of Balochistan. While Pakistan expressed condolences for those affected by the Pahalgam attack, the initial mood in Islamabad had an air of belligerent denial – with accusations rife online that terror attack was a ‘false flag operation’.
International partners are engaging to encourage de-escalation – but notably most have not commented adversely (or at all) on India’s choice to respond militarily. China is likely quietly engaged. While close to Pakistan, they have no interest in hot conflict between India and Pakistan. Perhaps most interesting is Saudi Arabian engagement, including the visit of their Foreign Minister to Delhi on 8 May. Riyadh enjoys good relations with both Delhi and Islamabad. But whatever external discussions take place, decisions to deescalate will be Pakistan and India’s to make.
Nearly eight decades since 1947, instability appears to be a feature, not a bug, of Pakistan’s relations with India. There is an opportunity to derisk the relationship by eliminating the networks that sustain attacks. While not the only agenda item, it carries the greatest potential for violent escalation. And it blocks the possibility of a more stable and viable modus vivendi between two nuclear states. A serious bilateral discussion on that feels remote. The immediate question: when and how will the current round of military action stop?
Alexander Evans is a Professor in Practice at the London School of Economics
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