A decades-long failure to take Vladimir Putin’s warnings at face value has proven dangerously counterproductive. Putin has made it clear that Nato’s eastward expansion is perceived as an existential threat to Russia, using it as justification for his invasion of Ukraine. Despite this, Keir Starmer persists in advocating for Nato peacekeepers in Ukraine – a proposal destined to fail and which risks squandering precious time Ukraine does not have.
When Foreign Secretary David Lammy declares that Putin should have no veto over security arrangements, he denies the fundamental reality of peace negotiations. Of course, Putin does hold an effective veto: no ceasefire can take hold without Russia’s agreement, just as it cannot without Ukraine’s.
The question is the cost each side is willing to bear to withhold its signature. For Ukraine, refusal risks the ire of the US, withdrawal of funding and military aid, and subsequent Russian advances – especially painful in light of lost gains in the Russian region of Kursk.
For Russia, rejecting a ceasefire conditioned on Nato peacekeepers could invite intensified sanctions and yet more international condemnation. Yet Putin has shown he is willing to absorb severe costs in response to Nato enlargement. Whether Russia’s Nato anxieties are legitimate is beside the point; what matters is its actions have consistently mirrored its public warnings.
In a 2007 speech at the Munich Security Conference, Putin criticised Nato expansion, particularly toward Georgia and Ukraine. The following year, the Nato declaration declared both were slated for future membership. Within months, Russia invaded Georgia, effectively annexing South Ossetia and Abkhazia.
Privately, Putin warned US officials that any attempt by Ukraine to join Nato would result in its loss of Crimea and the eastern regions. In 2013, Ukraine’s Euromaidan protests called for closer integration with the EU. Days after the Ukrainian president fled protests, Russia annexed Crimea and intervened in the East. None of this justifies Russian actions in Ukraine, it only demonstrates Putin’s strength of feeling over Nato.
Unsurprisingly, Putin has said he will not allow troops from Nato members to act as peacekeepers in Ukraine. Regardless, pressure to act keeps Starmer pushing at a closed door. He is enjoying his moment on the world stage, and has received a bounce in the polls.
A more pragmatic alternative would involve deploying ceasefire monitors from non-Nato countries. These unarmed monitors or lightly armed peacekeepers would serve purely in an observational capacity, equipped with radios, GPS units, UAVs, satellite phones, binoculars, maps, and standard blue helmets – no tanks or heavy artillery required. Their mission would be limited to monitoring compliance and reporting violations, and – as peacekeepers – only permitted to engage in self-defence. While President Trump has been openly critical of the United Nations, it remains neutral, uniquely experienced and well-equipped to handle ceasefire monitoring and peacekeeping operations. If Putin and Zelensky agreed to it, a UN mandate would be swift and practical.
Critics argue this approach is insufficient. Starmer has warned Putin will breach any deal without security guarantees. Yet history indicates otherwise. As a senior manager with the EU Monitoring Mission in Georgia following Russia’s invasion of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, dialogue was soon established with the Russians and a formal monthly meeting schedule was established. Within this mechanism, the Russians remained disciplined, ensuring their forces respected agreed boundaries.
Putin positions himself as a defender of Global South interests. This should help temper infractions
As head of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe mission in Donetsk, I saw the challenges and limitations of the Minsk ceasefire agreements. Though far from perfect, Minsk II significantly reduced the conflict’s intensity.
However, unlike in Georgia, the President of Russia was not a direct signatory. Nor was it his foreign minister, or even a cabinet minister, but rather the ambassador to Ukraine. This deliberate choice indicated Russia was signalling only a brokering role. It was not signing as a belligerent, would take no responsibility for breaches of the agreement, and preserved plausible deniability regarding the actions of leaders from apparent breakaway regions who were also signatories. Ukraine mirrored this approach, with a former president, who held no official government authority at the time, signing on its behalf.
The façade of separatist breakaway regions has now dropped. A ceasefire in Ukraine, as in Georgia, will require the President of Russia’s signature to ensure clear lines of accountability. If the UN were to assume a monitoring role, personnel would likely be drawn from nations experienced in previous peacekeeping missions – such as Bangladesh, China, Pakistan, India, Nigeria, Kenya, Jordan, Cambodia, Cameroon, Nepal, Morocco, Tanzania, Ethiopia. The predominance of peacekeepers from the Global South is strategically important. Putin frequently positions himself as a defender of Global South interests against what he characterises as a hypocritical western-led order. It should help temper infractions, particularly those that might endanger peacekeepers.
One must listen, rather than reflexively dismiss, the concerns of adversaries in order to negotiate effectively. Only through realism can a durable path towards lasting peace be established.
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