With the launch of Operation ‘Rising Lion’, Israel appears to have sought to take advantage of a narrow window of opportunity. Through its own actions over the last 18 months, the Iranian regime brought itself to a moment of extreme vulnerability. Tehran found itself in an uncomfortable position in which it continued to seek to prosecute its long war against Israel – intended to result in the Jewish state’s demise – while at the same time finding itself shorn of many of the capacities for aggression and defence on which it had relied. Israel has struck in this narrow window. Iranian has retaliated. The two sides are continuing to exchange strikes.
The weakening of Iran in recent months has occurred on two directly related fronts. Firstly, Tehran has long relied on a system of proxies to conduct aggression against enemies and to deter said enemies from responding. The attack by the Tehran-aligned Hamas organisation against Israel on 7 October 2023 led to a partial and piecemeal mobilisation by Iranian proxies to assist Hamas as it faced Israel’s determined counter-attack in Gaza.
Iranian strategy for decades has been to subject Israel to a death by a thousand cuts
The result of this partial counter-mobilisation – by Lebanese Hezbollah, the Yemeni Ansar Allah (Houthis) and the Iraqi Shia militias – was not, however, the one that Tehran had hoped for. Far from, as intended, forcing Israel to abandon its effort to destroy Hamas in Gaza, Iran’s mobilisation of proxies has resulted in the severe weakening of the proxies themselves.
In retrospect, it is clear that Iran had made one of the cardinal errors of irregular warfare – namely, never allow yourself to be drawn into open battle against a conventionally superior adversary. By attempting to strike at Israel at a time when Jerusalem was already engaged in war, Iran’s proxies brought down the full weight of Israel’s advanced capacities for air and intelligence warfare on their own heads.
The result? Lebanese Hezbollah, Tehran’s main tool for power projection and deterrence, is today a shadow of its former self. Its historic leadership has been destroyed, its mid-level cadres decimated, its military array along the border obliterated, and its advanced weapons systems severely depleted.
The Iraqi Shia militias, too, unilaterally pulled out of the fight in late 2024. The Yemeni Houthis, proving an unexpectedly tougher nut to crack, are still on their feet. But their capacity to penetrate Israeli airspace has been severely limited throughout, while their own infrastructure now stands helpless and exposed against the attention of Israeli air and naval assets.
This was demonstrated in recent days with Israel’s bombardment from the sea of the Hodeidah port and its earlier air action against the airport at Sana’a. The bottom line is that the proxy array, it is now clear, was useful only in so far as it pursued a long, attritional war intended to bleed Israeli resilience. (It didn’t manage that, either, but at least avoided severe damage while its masters year in and year out proclaimed the imminent success of this effort). Once drawn into the open, its weakness was laid bare.
The second related weakening of Iran concerns its own capacities. In April last year, when it became clear to Iran that Israel was not going to avoid directly targeting Iranian personnel deployed alongside Tehran’s proxies, Iran took the fateful decision to directly target Israel for the first time. Met with a limited response, it tried again in October. Israel’s response the second time was extensive and very damaging. Iran has in subsequent months been almost bereft of air defences.
So the net result of the decision by Iran’s client organisation Hamas to initiate war against Israel in October 2023 was the severe weakening of both Tehran’s direct and proxy capacities to make war and to deter and to defend against adversaries.
At the same time, as has become apparent in recent days, this weakening in no way served to temper Iran’s resolve or its ambitions. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) this week for the first time declared Tehran formally in breach of its obligations under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Iran possesses sufficient enriched uranium to construct 8-10 nuclear devices within weeks. Its propaganda organs continue to call for Israel’s destruction. Iran is engaged in rebuilding and seeking to resupply Hezbollah in Lebanon. A brand new IRGC proxy group, the ’Islamic Resistance in Syria’, fired rockets at Israel for the first time last week.
So the combination of severely reduced capacities with continuing politicidal intentions and efforts evidently brought Israel to the decision to strike at Iran’s nuclear facilities. It is a historic moment for the Middle East. What is likely to follow?
Iranian strategy for decades, openly declared, has been to subject Israel to a death by a thousand cuts. That is, to strike at and demoralise and slowly deplete the Jewish state, Israel, all the while deterring an effective response through the perceived Israeli fear of casualties. Israel in the last 18 months has identified this strategy and has chosen not to play its allotted role. The result is the open confrontation which has now begun.
The precise dimensions of the damage Israel has inflicted on Iran’s nuclear capacities and its senior military command have not yet become apparent. They are likely to be considerable but far short of a knockout blow. Iranian has retaliated. That hasn’t been a conclusive move either. This means, in short, that the long overture in the conflict between Israel and Iran is completed. The main part is now beginning.
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