Sabotage seems to be back with a bang – and if not with a bang, certainly with a lot of smoke. Incidents have come thick and fast since 2022 when someone – and it still is not clear who – sabotaged pipelines in the Baltic Sea to disable the flow of natural gas from Germany to Russia. Since then, we have seen suspicious fires (or attempted fires) everywhere from an Ikea warehouse in Lithuania to a paint factory in Poland; we have seen explosions at defence plants and arms manufacturers spanning the US, Wales, and Germany. Meanwhile, arson brought French railways to a standstill on the eve of the 2024 Olympic Games.
And that is to say nothing of the separate – but spectacular – Israeli sabotage of Hezbollah communications devices in September.
Sabotage is attritional. A temporary paralysis
Intelligence chiefs are alarmed. Earlier this month Ken McCallum, the head of MI5, publicly warned that Russian intelligence is ‘on a sustained mission to generate mayhem on British and European streets: we’ve seen arson, sabotage and more.’ His warning followed others made by his counterparts in MI6 and the CIA of a ‘reckless campaign of sabotage across Europe’ by Russia. European intelligence and security chiefs have joined the chorus. The Czechs have warned of attempts to sabotage European railways; the Norwegians are worried too.
Combined, it all makes for a rather alarming picture. And one which inevitably colours interpretations of any new incident, such as the fire that broke out at a British nuclear submarine shipyard in Cumbria on Tuesday night. As investigators probe faulty equipment, many will look to hostile states and wonder if there is smoke without fire.
Russia has certainly been implicated in a lot of sabotage attacks recently and is employing what some have termed a ‘gig economy’ approach, with flexible recruitment of saboteurs enabling an increased tempo at reduced cost. And all while enjoying the benefits of so-called (im)plausible deniability.
Not all sabotage is caused by Russia. The exploding Hezbollah pagers are testament to that. And after initial suspicions of Kremlin involvement in the rail chaos on the eve of the Olympics, French investigators have since pointed the finger at extremist far-left groups. Indeed, not all sabotage is sponsored or directed by a hostile state. In fact, not all sabotage is sabotage. Accidents do happen, especially in complex and sometimes poorly maintained infrastructure. Some days the British rail infrastructure does a very convincing impersonation of having been sabotaged by a particularly cruel and vindictive actor.
Talk of state sponsorship is too simplistic; a spectrum of involvement exists from intelligence officers directly committing sabotage through to turning a blind eye to criminal groups operating independently. Mapping this and attributing incidents is difficult, but understanding the spectrum is imperative when responding. Hostile states, violent groups, petty criminals, corporate negligence, and genuine accidents all co-exist to create an altogether ambiguous situation. This can too easily be exploited by states like Russia where the Kremlin gets the credit – so to speak – for fire across Europe. Suddenly Putin looks ten feet tall and a grand master of the dark arts of covert operations, just like many commentators thought he was a master of disinformation. Sabotage works hand in glove with disinformation to weaponise friction, weaken resolve: to disrupt, delay and degrade. It is of little surprise that just as in the Cold War, Russian sabotage today is accompanied by propaganda and disinformation campaigns designed to generate uncertainty and erode morale. We must understand them together.
Following a period of panic, we are increasingly realising that, just as downplaying it, exaggerating the threat of disinformation helps foreign propagandists. The same principle is true for sabotage. The threat must be taken very seriously, but exaggeration risks helping foreign saboteurs. We will end up frustrating ourselves, weaponising our own friction, and doing the saboteurs’ job for them. If every fire in an arms depot is seen as a Russian attempt to increase the costs of supporting Ukraine – then that is exactly what it becomes. Paranoia will be induced; morale will sap.
Likewise, history shows that even the most dramatic and infamous sabotage operations, such as those conducted by the wartime Special Operations Executive (charged with setting Europe ablaze in world war two), rarely offers a decisive blow, but is instead a disrupter. Sabotage degrades targets, buys time, softens up. It is attritional. A temporary paralysis. Accordingly, it complements other tools of statecraft, both conventional and covert. Building resilience, both psychologically and physically, is key allowing us to turn attention to those other tools. If Russia, or any other state for that matter, is adopting sabotage as an end rather than a means, they will likely end up disappointed. But we could all end up more miserable for it in the meantime.
Comments