The case against Aukus

Just weeks after the denouement of the West’s misadventure in Afghanistan, Boris Johnson is again committing Britain to a risky international venture. Aukus, the naval partnership between the United States, Australia and the United Kingdom, appears to tie Britain to an Indo-Pacific strategy that is militarily and geopolitically flawed.

In December 1941, the catastrophic sinking of the then imperious new battleship HMS Prince of Wales along with the battlecruiser HMS Repulse off the coast of Malaya led to the loss of Singapore and brought the curtains down on Britain’s Asian Empire. Britain was over-stretched and unable to commit resources to the defence of the Pacific.

History rarely repeats itself exactly. Nevertheless, it must be asked whether Britain, which is a relatively far weaker power now than in 1941, is again risking overreach in committing itself to the Indo-Pacific.

Since the rise of Xi Jinping and the development of his increasingly expansionist naval policies in the South China Sea, the need to contain China has become self–evident. The problem for the West is the question of whose task this is.

Aukus adds to a confusing smorgasbord of alliances competing to stand up to Xi. There is the Quad (US, Japan, Australia and India), the TPP (the Trans-Pacific Partnership) and Five Eyes (an intelligence alliance comprising Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the UK and the US). In addition, there are bilateral military relationships such as that between India and Japan. However there is no Asian Nato to coordinate China’s putative enemies.

Aukus has sowed further division. The secret submarine deal effectively stitched up France. On a scale of one to ten, France’s upset is 12. This was hardly a way to treat an ally which has consistently committed naval resources to the Indo-Pacific since 2013.