The elite who tried to save Russia

The veteran Russian historian Dominic Lieven’s new study of Russia’s descent towards the first world war is deeply researched, highly valuable in its focus on Russia, and unfailingly well-written: more proof of Lieven’s profound knowledge of the Russian empire.

One of his earlier works, Russia’s Rulers Under the Old Regime (1989), focused on the 150 men who ran Russia until 1917. Towards the Flame shares that work’s careful attention to a tiny elite of well-educated, cosmopolitan, mostly aristocratic men. With breathtaking directness, he says that fewer than 50 men (and it was all men) in Europe in 1914 took the decisions that led their countries into war.

Towards the Flame starts with a few donnish chapters from what Lieven calls the ‘God’s eye view’. We learn about Europe’s struggles with nationalism, geopolitics and international economics. Though Lieven is not the first to say so, it is useful to be reminded that either Germany or Russia could have gained mastery of Europe by avoiding war and developing their industries instead. Russia was a giant in the making, before the calamity that was its 20th (and, arguably, the start of its 21st) century.

All too often, discussions of Russia in the period revolve around the fate of Nicholas II and his family, Rasputin and the revolutionaries. Lieven provides a welcome corrective, analysing Russia’s foreign policies as directed by little-known, if highly influential, individuals. He is excellent in his discussions of Grigorii Trubetskoy, Aleksandr Izvolsky, Alexander Benckendorff and Serge Sazonov; and their critics such as Petr Durnovo, Roman Rosen and Aleksandr Giers. His scope includes the emergence of the Triple Entente, the Balkan Wars (1912–13), the 1914 crisis and the first years of the war.

Throughout, one is struck by Lieven’s empathy with the elite he discusses.