This week, Russia launched a missile attack on Dnipro, Ukraine, reportedly using a new medium-range ballistic missile named ‘Oreshnik’, as confirmed yesterday by President Putin. Putin stated that the missile attack was a response to Ukraine’s use of western-built missile systems inside Russia, including US-supplied ATACMS ballistic missiles and British Storm Shadow cruise missiles.
Before this confirmation, speculation arose that Russia might have launched an intercontinental-range ballistic missile. This claim was initially reported by President Zelensky the morning after the attack, who noted that the missile’s flight path characteristics matched those of an intercontinental-range ballistic missile.
While Putin unveiled the Oreshnik as a novel addition to Russia’s arsenal, it is likely a derivative of an existing design
This speculation was further fuelled by video imagery of the attack indicating that the missile carried a MIRVed payload. MIRV, or ‘multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicles’, allows a single missile to carry multiple warheads, each capable of striking different targets independently. This significantly increases a missile’s destructive potential and complicates missile defence efforts.
Before this week, MIRV technology had been exclusively limited to Russian intermediate- and intercontinental-range ballistic missiles. Now it has been confirmed that Russia has added MIRV technology to the Oreshnik medium-range ballistic missile. Video imagery of the Russian attack suggests it involved at least one MIRVed missile, carrying what appears to be six warheads that descended onto their targets in quick succession.
While Putin unveiled the Oreshnik as a novel addition to Russia’s arsenal, it is likely a derivative of an existing design, potentially resembling the Russian RS-26 ‘Rubezh’ intermediate-range ballistic missile. Russia’s missile development of the RS-26 began in 2008 but was discontinued in 2018 before it reached full operational capability. Its potential maximum range remains uncertain. During development, most test flights demonstrated a range of up to 2,000 km, although one test reached 5,800 km. This extended range technically qualifies the system as an intercontinental-range ballistic missile, as most definitions set the threshold for intercontinental range at 5,500 km.
Russia likely based the new missile on an existing design rather than developing one from scratch, given that its defence-industrial assets – particularly its missile industry – are operating at maximum capacity to support the war effort in Ukraine. Under these conditions, it is improbable that Russian industry has the capability to design, develop, test, and field a completely new missile in significant numbers, within a relatively short timeframe.
Like the missile used in the attack on Dnipro, the RS-26 was capable of carrying a MIRVed payload, reportedly accommodating up to four nuclear warheads. The missile used in this week’s attack, however, appears to have carried a slightly larger number of warheads, suggesting it may be heavier, potentially resulting in a more limited range compared to the RS-26.
The target of the attack, the city of Dnipro, is known for its missile-related industry. It played a key role in supporting the Soviet Union’s development of intercontinental ballistic missiles and continues to contribute to Ukrainian missile programmes. Dnipro was likely chosen as a target both for its symbolic significance – due to its association with missiles capable of striking Russia – and its military relevance.
That said, early reports indicate that the attack caused no significant damage and did not result in any loss of life. This outcome is not entirely surprising. The new ballistic missile, based on a missile originally designed as a delivery vehicle for nuclear warheads, likely lacks the accuracy needed to inflict substantial damage using conventional warheads. While the immense destructive power of nuclear payloads can compensate for a lack of accuracy, conventional warheads must strike their targets with precision to be effective.
Russia was likely aware that the attack might fail to achieve its military objectives but proceeded nonetheless to send a political message. In fact, the nuclear threat implied by the missile strike – due to the association of MIRV technology with nuclear weapons – was likely the primary reason behind the decision. As a result, the West – including the United Kingdom, Germany, and the United States – was as much a target of the strike as Ukraine, aiming to discourage the expansion and continuation of military aid to Ukraine.
Another possible reason for the attack was to demonstrate that Russia retains the capability to inflict destruction in Ukraine at will, despite Ukraine’s growing arsenal of western missile defence systems.
Ukraine’s most advanced missile defence capability, the US-built Patriot air and missile defence system, can defend against ballistic missile strikes but is likely ineffective against this new type of ballistic missile threat. The missile’s demonstrated trajectory and speed during this week’s attack makes interception more challenging and requires specialised missile defence capabilities, which have yet to be supplied to Ukraine. Even if a missile like this cannot deliver its warheads with high accuracy, it is still likely capable of causing substantial damage when launched indiscriminately against population centres like Kyiv.
For the United Kingdom and other western allies of Ukraine, it is important to avoid overreacting to this development. While Russia’s signalling should not be dismissed, we can take reassurance in the fact that there remains a considerable gap between the launch of this type of missile and the use of a nuclear warhead, particularly one aimed at a Nato country. Moreover, given the significant risks nuclear use would pose to Russia itself, the likelihood of such an escalation remains very low, at least for now.
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