On Friday a four-day ceasefire between Israel and Hamas began, as the first hostages taken by Hamas were released by the terrorist group. Under the deal struck, 50 Israeli women and children will be released in exchange for 150 Palestinian prisoners, who will be freed over the four-day period. Additionally, the Israeli government said the lull in hostilities will be extended for an additional day for every ten more hostages Hamas releases.
In theory, the cessation of hostilities between Israel and Hamas could last until all 240 hostages are released. And some may hope that the complex ceasefire arrangements might lead to an extended truce. But in reality, it is likely that the war will begin again soon, with the Israeli government vowing to not stop fighting until Hamas is destroyed and its terrorist network is obliterated.
When the fighting begins again, the Israeli army will turn south and head into what Hamas regards as its stronghold. And the war will change significantly.
Israel knows that a lull in fighting or ceasefire – they amount to the same thing – plays into Hamas’s hands. Up until now the attacks against Hamas had been unrelenting and unlike anything the terrorist group had experienced in the past. But every day that passes without fighting taking place will allow Hamas the time to regroup, rearm and remerge from the tunnels knowing that they are safe from attack.
As far as Israel is concerned the temporary pause in fighting is simply delaying the inevitable. Eylon Levy, a spokesman for the Israeli government, told the BBC:
‘This war has to end with the end of Hamas. We are going to totally destroy Hamas’s terrorist and governing infrastructure inside the Gaza strip and we are coming after every Hamas rocket launcher, every tunnel and every Hamas terrorist. If we don’t do this, if we don’t end it this time, there will be a next time and the next time will be worse because Hamas will be emboldened to attack us again. It’s promising openly that it wants to perpetrate another October 7th massacre. It’s proven it has the capability to do so.’
But to achieve that aim the IDF will have to enter southern Gaza and the fighting is likely to be much more ferocious and bloody.
The cities of Khan Yunis and Rafah, which sits close to the border with Egypt, are known strongholds of Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad, whose members are also signed up to the destruction of Israel.
The south also contains several large refugee camps and the area below the Wadi Gaza is now packed with almost two million civilians.
The concentration of such a large number of civilians in a relatively small area would suggest that the IDF’s strategy of a lengthy bombing campaign before sending in ground troops is impossible, unless Israel is prepared to accept casualties at a rate which dwarfs those already suffered by Gazans. Figures supplied by the Hamas controlled health ministry, but which are disputed by the IDF, state that over 14,000 Gazan civilians have been killed in the conflict.
To take the south, thousands of ground troops will have to fight through Palestinian neighbourhoods where it will be almost impossible to distinguish between terrorists and civilians. If this scenario unfolds, casualties on both sides may well be considerably higher than those suffered so far.
It is safe to say that so far the war has not quite unfolded in the way that many observers, myself included, predicted. Although Israeli soldiers have been killed – mostly in hit and run attacks – the high number of predicted casualties has failed to materialise. By contrast, the IDF claims to have killed thousands of Hamas fighters in the six weeks following the October 7th atrocity which left 1,200 Israelis dead and over 3,000 injured.
But even if thousands of Palestinian terrorists have been killed – and Hamas and the PIJ had a combined force of at least 30,000 fighters – where have the remainder gone? Are they still hiding in the estimated 300 miles of tunnels beneath the Gaza strip? Or have they fled south in preparation for the next phase of the war?
Avi Melamed, a former Israeli intelligence official, agrees that Israeli operations in Gaza are about to change. and become increasingly challenging for the IDF.
He says: ‘The fight for Southern Gaza will likely be even more complicated for Israel as it looks to continue its model of isolating, securing and clearing each location of Hamas fighters, tunnels, strategic positions and weaponry. The South has more refugee camps, now cities unto themselves and major hotbeds of Islamist terrorist activity, including both PIJ and Hamas battalions, and Khan Younis and Rafah are also hotbeds of activity by both groups.’
Meanwhile the war in Gaza has opened up something of a rift between Britain’s armed forces and the position of the British government.
A senior British military officer told me earlier this week that many senior officers believed that Israel’s response to 7th October attacks were a ‘gross over-reaction’. The officer also said that many senior officers had openly questioned the UK’s ‘unequivocal support’ for the conflict in Gaza.
The officer, a veteran of the counter-insurgencies in both Iraq and Afghanistan, added: ‘Israel’s desire must be the long-term security and prosperity of the state and its people. But the Israeli government’s actions, if anything, are imperilling that.’
When asked what he thought the appropriate strategy might be, he said: ‘I think I would have gone with some massive targeted precision strike, with accepted collateral damage, understanding that it would have limited effect perhaps on tunnels and operation centres but would have provided the population with a visible response, while at the same time proactively targeting Hamas leaders outside of the region in Mossad sponsored extrajudicial assassinations.’
He added: ‘Time is not on Israel’s side. The unfolding humanitarian crisis which is developing in Gaza may very well derail its entire strategy, which is why Israel is moving very quickly in seeking the return of the hostages.’
What is clear is that the next stage of the war is going to be even tricker for the Israeli Defence Forces.
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