From ‘How it looks to a German’, The Spectator, 17 April 1915:
Try to imagine how things must look to a German who dares to put off the mask of self-complacency which the German people have deliberately worn ever since the beginning of the war and to face the facts, the whole facts, and nothing but the facts.
Surely no nation in history ever had a more gloomy, nay, a more terrifying, prospect in front of them in spite of one or two apparent advantages. It is true that there is little or no fighting going on upon German soil, for the woes of Austria-Hungary in this respect do not count. It is true, also, that the Germans have still a great superiority in equipment, especially in ammunition, explosives, guns, and rifles. It is true, again, that they have not yet exhausted their supplies of men. For the moment, that is, an apparently good case can be made out for the German optimist.
If the German thinks only of what he sees before his eyes, he has, we admit, a fairly good reason for keeping up bis spirits. What he dare not do, however, is to look on the future. Whence is there any hope of succour coming for the Germans and the Austrians? If they look seaward, it is not there. If they look to the mountain-tops, no flight of imagination can give hope that they will bless the feet of those who bear good tidings. There is not a potentate, not a people in the world who really desire that Germany shall win, or who wish to bring them aid, as, for example, so large a portion of the people of Italy, of Roumania, and of Greece wish to bring aid to the Allies. Germany and Austria have no friends beyond the section of German voters whom they have mobilized, or think they have mobilized, in the United States. This section, however, is very much smaller than the boasts of the German Embassy in Washington would lead us to believe.
The very best that an honest German cherishing no illusions could venture to say about the position is that Germany is like a fortress held by a brave, well-equipped garrison, and with an unbreached line of fortifications all round it—a fortress which defies the enemy to break through at any point. But even if this view of the unbreakable line were literally true, it would in reality afford very small consolation to the Germans unless they could count upon their enemies growing tired and breaking off the siege as hopeless of accomplishment. But no German who blows the facts and will really face them can possibly believe that the Allies will retire in despair from the work which they have taken in hand of reducing the German fortress. Germany’s treatment of Belgium and of the occupied districts of France, Germany’s piratical policy at sea, Germany’s action in Turkey, have so thoroughly alarmed the rest of the world, that, however much the Allies might secretly wish to give up the great siege, they would not dare to do so. They know that if Germany is not now beaten thoroughly they will never be able to sleep in safety again.
If Germany had waged this war in the old way, in the way, say, in which the Crimean War was fought, the combatants might have got tired and gone back to the status quo. There is not the slightest possibility of such a conclusion of the present struggle. The siege will go on till the bitter end. The besiegers must persist even if it is a siege as long as that of Troy. Not only are the resources of the Allies much greater in men and wealth, but their energies are constantly revivified by contact with the outside world. The gates of Germany are shut. The gates of France, of Britain, and of Russia stand always open to replenishment from the rest of the world. But, granted that the besiegers are steadfast, there is but one fate for besieged places, however strong. If none come to raise the siege from outside—and none can come to do that for Germany—they must fall, as Zion or as Carthage fell before the armies of Rome, as Constantinople yielded to the Turks, or as Paris to the Germans.
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