In a recent conversation with a Cameroon about the Tory Leader’s foreign policy overtures, I was alerted to William Hague’s July speech at the Institute for Strategic Studies during which the Shadow Foreign Secretary said the world faces a “new age of insecurity” unless the brakes are put on nuclear proliferation.
In many ways, his concern sits a little uncomfortably with today’s dominant foreign policy narratives. We are meant mainly to talk about home-grown terrorists, climate change and – after Georgia’s buffoonery and Russia’s aggression – the resurgence of Cold War–style confrontation with Moscow as well as the rise of China.
But while these challenges are serious and need to be addressed, Hague’s speech served – and for latecomers like me, still serves – as a useful reminder of the threats of weapons proliferation. Hague noted that the removal of technological barriers and a globe-spanning black market have improved the availability of WMDs, both for rogue states and terrorists.
To deal with this, the “Hague Plan” has eight points: 1) A conference of the 5 nuclear weapons powers; 2) A new drive to revive the NPT; 3) A new Security Council resolution to close loopholes in the NPT; 4) A mechanism to bring the dangerous nuclear fuel cycle under international control; 5) Strengthen the IAEA; 6) Clamp down on trafficking in nuclear technology; 7) Isolate proliferators from the international financial system and 8) A stronger international strategy to deal with Iran.
This is all good stuff, but before developing a big programme Britain should take the lead in addressing point five, i.e. strengthening the IAEA. The organisation, which we rely on to monitor nuclear proliferation, has an annual safeguards budget of only $ 145 million. Compare this to billion dollar price of a nuclear power-reactor? It clearly struggles to perform its tasks. As Hague points out, the IAEA’s budget is smaller “than the budget of the police department of the city in which it is located.”
So what about a safeguards levy on nuclear power reactor contracts, which could be funnelled to the IAEA? Naturally this would have to be coupled with reforms aimed at developing safeguards options that would go further than the IAEA’s Additional Protocol, that are clearly not enough to police proliferation. These reforms will not deal with Iran, but they may help the West address the next crisis.
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