Britain is heavily dependent on its underwater infrastructure. Ninety-nine per cent of our digital communications overseas are carried through subsea fibre optic cables.
Significant damage to them at the hands of malign actors would jeopardise our way of life. Defence Secretary John Healey reported to parliament on an incident last November when a Russian spy ship, Yantar, was detected ‘loitering over UK critical undersea infrastructure’ off Cornwall, a chokepoint for trans-Atlantic underwater communications. After the rapid deployment of ships, aircraft and submarines by Britain, Yantar took the hint to leave and is now, after a spell in the Mediterranean, on her war back home with the Royal Navy closely monitoring her movements.
Russian mischief is not new. The Soviet Union invested heavily in capabilities to sabotage Nato’s critical infrastructure (just as the UK cut the copper telegraph lines connecting Germany to the United States at the start of the first world war). That money also allowed the Soviets to map Nato’s critical undersea systems.
Putin has maintained Russia’s focus on the underwater. It today deploys a fleet of specialist submarines, naval ships and auxiliaries that use an array of sensors, manned and unmanned underwater vehicles. Yantar for example can send a crewed submersible down to below 20,000 feet.
The November incident was the latest of many over the last 20 years; Yantar has been a regular visitor to UK and Irish waters. In 2023, Ben Wallace the then defence secretary, pointed out that Russian submarines ‘in the North Atlantic and in the Irish Sea and in the North Sea [have been] doing some strange routes that they normally wouldn’t do’.
The Royal Navy is tasked with protecting critical undersea infrastructure. A new ocean surveillance ship, RFA Proteus, was used during the Yantar incident. The UK has also started an operation with its partners in the ten-nation Joint Expeditionary Force to track threats to undersea infrastructure, monitor the movements of the Russian shadow fleet suspected of damaging Baltic infrastructure, and issue real-time warnings of suspicious activity.
At the Nato Vilnius summit in 2023, the alliance established a new base on the outskirts of London for robust coordination, monitoring and countering of malign threats, and to deny any aggressor the cover of plausible deniability. Nato has also sent ships and aircraft to the Baltic.
The UK has a vital role in securing Europe’s maritime flank. In the Commons John Healey said that ‘those who might enter our waters with malign intent, or try to undertake any malign activity, know that we see them and know that they will face the strongest possible response’. For such a strong response to be credible will require sufficient ships, aircraft, and submarines ready to act. These have all been hollowed out over the last 30 years. The Strategic Defence Review is an obvious opportunity to ensure our vast, unseen, critical network of underwater infrastructure remains protected.
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