As with so many of the aphorisms and witticisms attributed to Winston Churchill, it is impossible to verify whether the greatest Briton actually ever said that ‘Americans can always be trusted to the right thing, once all the other possibilities have been exhausted’. But that expression immediately came to my mind when reading J. D. Vance’s UnHerd interview – and over a remark entailing Churchill’s prime ministerial successor, to boot. Vance’s real message to Europe? Anthony Eden woz rite.
The Vice-President said much of interest. The news that the UK and US are close to signing a ‘great agreement’ on trade had the Ftse 100 rallying. Vance’s claim that that ‘you can’t separate American culture from European culture’ will surprise and delight those on this side of the Atlantic only familiar with him from his recent performances in Munich and the Oval Office. His confirmation that Donald Trump ‘loves the King’ will make Keir Starmer even keener on finalising that state visit.
Yet it was what Vance said about a strong and independent Europe that piqued my interest most. The Vice-President referenced Charles de Gaulle, suggesting Europe should not be a permanent security vassal of the United States, but a counterweight to it, especially if this means resisting American mistakes. He gave a historic example: ‘I think – frankly – the British and French were certainly right in their disagreements with Eisenhower about the Suez Canal’ – an especially timely suggestion.
Two weeks ago, it became 70 years since Eden succeed Churchill as Leader of the Conservative Party and Prime Minister. His reputation has been crucified on the altar of the Suez Crisis that preceded his resignation in 1957. In a December 1999 BBC survey of 20 prominent historians, he was ranked as the worst Prime Minister of the 20th century. He again placed last in two surveys of more than eighty academics by the University of Leeds in both 2010 and 2016, only beaten in 2021 by Theresa May.
In 1956, Colonel Nasser, Egypt’s President, nationalised the Suez Canal, Britain’s largest overseas asset, our shares bought by Benjamin Disraeli in 1875. By 1956, nearly two-thirds of Britain’s oil came through the canal. Having worked fruitlessly through international talks for a resolution, Eden colluded with the French and Israelis to launch an Israeli attack on Egypt. An Anglo-French force would then intervene in a ‘police action’ to break up the fighting.
Militarily, the operation was a success, with half the Canal Zone taken. But it was called off midway through due to two dependable but lamentable political constants: Tory duplicity and American short-sightedness. Harold Macmillan, then Chancellor, wanted Eden’s job. Dwight Eisenhower was days away from a presidential election, and needing to appease isolationist voters, opposed the action. Macmillan exaggerated the threat of a sterling crisis, and Eden halted the operation.
The public outcry was tremendous. Even though opinion polls suggested Tory voters remained foursquare behind Eden, he was harangued by Labour, and press criticism – including from The Spectator – was persistent. Having taken a three-week holiday in Jamaica to restore his health, Eden was accused of lying to MPs as to his foreknowledge of Israel’s actions. He resigned weeks later, having been Prime Minister for only eighteen months, to be succeeded by Macmillan.
Suez has since become a by-word for prime ministerial folly, a Middle Eastern mess muttered about as darkly as Iraq would be for another premier named Anthony decades later. It is said to have proved Britain was no longer a world power, and that we could never again afford to act independently of the United States. Whilst decolonisation had already begun, the loss of face of the Suez reversal ensured the process was sped up once Macmillan’s ‘Winds of Change’ blustered out of Downing Street.
The merits of the Suez scheme have been forgotten. As Andrew Roberts has written, if the operation had been successful, Nasser would likely have fallen. ‘Over-hasty decolonisation’ in the following decades ‘might have been avoided’. Britain would have been better placed to resist the Muslim fundamentalism and Arab nationalism that swept the region than Tony Blair was. Our over-reliance on – or vassalage to – the United States might have been avoided, our confidence maintained.
Indeed, Eisenhower came to regret failing to side with Britain. His hastiness in letting the us be forced from the region looked increasingly ill-advised as Nasser grew ever closer to the Soviet Union. In that sense, Vance’s comments should be taken as an official acknowledgement that Eisenhower’s choice to put short-term political calculation ahead of Britain’s ability to act independently on the world stage was a mistake. A strong and confident Britain is a better friend than a humiliated and dependent one.
In Britain, this should not only add greater urgency to the government’s efforts to increase defence spending but prompt a revaluation of a politician whose career has been unfairly maligned. Eden was a man who devoted his life to peace, who had resigned from Neville Chamberlain’s cabinet in 1938 over appeasement and served as Churchill’s deputy for 15 years. Suez should not be seen as a mistake, but a glimpse of the world power Britain could be again, if we hadn’t lost our nerve.
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