Fabian Hoffmann

What we know so far about Iran’s massive missile attack

A school in Gedera following Iran’s missile attack (photo: Getty)

Last night, Iran launched a large-scale missile strike against Israel, dubbed ‘Operation True Promise II’. According to the latest reports, the attack involved approximately 180 ballistic missiles, making it one of the largest missile assaults in history.

Iranian officials stated that the attack was in retaliation for the assassination of Hamas’s political leader Ismail Haniyeh in Iran in late July, the killing of Hezbollah Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah in Lebanon last week, and Israel’s broader conduct in the region in recent months.

Details about the attack, including its targets and the damage caused, remain murky at this time. But it seems that Iran targeted Nevatim airbase, Tel Nof airbase, and the headquarters of Mossad, Israel’s intelligence service. 

Nevatim airbase was already struck by Iranian missiles in April with minimal effect. This time, videos show around a dozen missiles striking the airbase, though it is unclear what damage the attack caused. The airbase, which is home to Israel’s F-35 fleet, quickly became the subject of Iranian media reports claiming that several of Israel’s most advanced aircraft had been destroyed. However, no evidence has surfaced to support these claims.

Tel Nof airbase appears to have been struck by several ballistic missiles, with at least one impact resulting in secondary explosions, likely from stored munitions. As well as hosting military aircraft, the airbase is also suspected to house Israeli nuclear bombs. But even if these were present during the attack, they are likely stored in specially secured, deep underground bunkers, out of reach of Iranian ballistic missiles. 

The Mossad headquarters on the northern outskirts of Tel-Aviv remain unharmed. The closest ballistic missile appears to have landed approximately 500 meters away in Gilliot, with no other impacts reported. 

Another missile struck and damaged a school in Gedera, south of Tel Aviv. Overall, there are only a few reports of minor injuries, likely from shell shock and flying fragments, and one individual died after being hit by a falling spent rocket booster which landed outside of Jericho in the West Bank.

Although the actual damage from the attack seems minimal, a substantial number of Iranian ballistic missiles managed to penetrate Israel’s integrated air and missile defence network, which is considered one of the most effective in the world.

Although Israeli and American officials have not disclosed the exact number of intercepted missiles, the percentage of ballistic missiles that penetrated the Israeli defences is likely higher than in April’s missile attack. In that instance, around 94 per cent of all the ballistic missiles were intercepted, along with a significant number of cruise missiles and long-range one-way attack drones.

Several potential explanations have been proposed for why Israel’s air defences were less effective this time. It could be that Iran launched a more concentrated volley of missiles targeting fewer objectives. Or it could have used more advanced ballistic missiles compared to the previous attack. It appears that Iran used larger numbers of Fattah-1 and Kheibarshekan medium-range ballistic missiles, which have greater manoeuvrability in the last stage of their flight, complicating missile defence.

Another reason could be that Israel exhausted much of its interceptor arsenal during the previous missile attack and was unable to replenish it in time, resulting in fewer targets successfully intercepted. This being said, several videos on social media appear to show successful intercepts both inside and outside the atmosphere, suggesting Israel used a a substantial amount of its David Sling, Arrow 2, and Arrow 3 interceptors. 

It’s important to keep in mind that not every impact captured on video will have been a successful strike. It is difficult to tell from a video the difference between a warhead hitting its target and falling missile debris after a successful intercept. In addition, several Iranian missiles that did land appear to have failed to accurately strike their targets. Israel may have also chosen to not intercept every incoming warhead, focusing its interceptor arsenal on defending higher-value objects instead. Nevertheless, the Iranians will likely see this attack as more successful than their April barrage. 

Israel’s response remains uncertain, though officials have vowed to retaliate. On the lower end, this could involve additional strikes against Iranian proxies in Lebanon, Syria, and Iraq. On the higher end, a retaliatory strike might target Iran directly, potentially hitting military installations, oil infrastructure, or even nuclear facilities. 

While a large-scale response is possible, it’s important to note that Israel likely cannot sustain a prolonged air campaign against Iran without direct US involvement, particularly against Iran’s nuclear infrastructure. Additionally, a strong Israeli response might be the last push Iran needs to weaponise its nuclear programme, a factor that will likely influence Israeli decisions. What is clear is that the coming days and weeks will be crucial in shaping the future of the Middle East.

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