As Donald Trump presses on with his breathless efforts to secure an end to the war in Ukraine, the leaders of Europe face a task of their own. In the event of a peace deal with Russia, how will they – in place of an America that can’t be trusted as a reliable ally – provide Kyiv with the security guarantees against Russian aggression that it craves? And even if they are willing, are they capable of delivering them?
The idea of sending a peacekeeping force to Ukraine at some point in the future has split Germany down the middle
Stepping out of the White House following Monday’s hastily arranged summit with Trump, Volodymyr Zelensky and other European leaders, German chancellor Friedrich Merz signalled that yes, his country was willing and able to provide Ukraine with security guarantees.
‘It is clear to me that we, as the Federal Republic of Germany, also have a strong interest and a strong responsibility to participate in this,’ he said. He caveated his declaration of intent by saying he would be discussing everything with European allies and that any final decision regarding German boots on the ground in Ukraine would be put to a vote in the Bundestag as per German law.
In what is increasingly becoming a pattern of this fairly new chancellor’s governance, Merz’s comments stirred the political hornets’ nest in Berlin within hours. By the time he had landed back in Germany, a full-throated debate on the Bundeswehr’s potential support for Ukraine was under way.
The idea of sending a peacekeeping force to Ukraine at some point in the future has split Germany down the middle. According to a poll conducted by the research institute Civey, 51 per cent of Germans think including the Bundeswehr in a peacekeeping mission to Ukraine is a bad idea. Just 36 per cent of respondents think it is a good one.
Russia’s invasion feels much closer to home for the average German – with just one country, Poland, separating them from the conflict. As such, right from the start of the war in February 2022, there has been a lingering sense of unease about politicians in Berlin dragging Germany into a war it did not start. The country’s Nazi past – still very much at the forefront of the national consciousness – makes the idea of proactively sending German troops into territory its predecessors did their best to annihilate barely 80-odd years ago sit uncomfortably with many, even if the circumstances are now vastly different. A survey from May showed that 64 per cent of Germans were at least ‘very worried’ about the return of war to Europe.
Both the German far right and the far left have jumped on Merz’s comments as an example of what they want to portray as his warmongering credentials. Alice Weidel, co-leader of the far-right Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) party branded his words ‘dangerous and irresponsible’.
By Tuesday, the AfD had mocked up an unnerving new post for their social media. Sending soldiers to Ukraine ‘would not be peacekeeping, but a permanent escalation against Russia’, it reads. Accompanying this was a sepia-toned image showing five frowning youths being loomed over by Merz, his smile fixed in a maniacal grin and the tips of his fingers touching in a steeple. Underneath, the slogan: ‘Merz wants to send YOU to Ukraine? We don’t!’
While superficially the image makes Merz look like a cartoon villain, it has prompted disgust for how evocative it is of the anti-Semitic propaganda distributed during the Nazi era portraying Jewish people as power-hungry villains. Many have seen this as yet further confirmation of how the AfD is growing increasingly comfortable flirting with the symbolism and rhetoric of Germany’s National Socialist past.
Sahra Wagenknecht, the far-left leader of the eponymous Bündnis Sahra Wagenknecht (BSW) also hopped on the bandwagon. In a video posted to social media on Wednesday, she warned: ‘Your father, your brother, your son could soon be fighting Russia in Ukraine.’ Merz’s willingness to consider sending troops to Ukraine is ‘dangerous’ and ‘completely oblivious to history’. ‘Should the conflict break out again, Germany would immediately become a party to the war,’ she added. She has called for a ‘peace rally’ in Berlin on 13 September to ‘stop the federal government’s war course’.
If such warnings of escalation in the conflict sound familiar, that’s because they are. Following the Ukraine summit in Washington on Monday, the spokesperson for the Russian foreign ministry Maria Zakharova addressed Ukraine’s allies in a statement. Reinforcing the Kremlin’s rejection of any Nato troops being sent into Ukraine to keep the peace, Zakharova said ‘this risks uncontrollable escalation with unpredictable consequences’. The AfD and BSW have made little effort to distance their messaging from that of Moscow’s.
Despite sitting on opposite sides of the political spectrum, both the AfD and BSW have, over the years, acquired reputations for being pro-Russia. They are both in favour of dropping sanctions against Moscow and restoring diplomatic relations. Both oppose sending weapons to Ukraine. But their calls for peace are also tinged with cynicism: the largest voter bases for both parties are predominantly located in the former East Germany, where cultural memory of the GDR means distrust of Nato and likewise a fear of Russian aggression are higher. Both the AfD and BSW are quite comfortable using the debate around a peacekeeping force in Ukraine to stoke fear with their voters.
Merz has had little help from his own cabinet in backing up his commitment to Ukraine. As the chancellor was flying to Washington, his foreign minister Johann Wadephul unhelpfully declared that sending German troops to Ukraine would ‘probably overwhelm’ the Bundeswehr alongside its commitment to creating a new brigade of 5,000 in Lithuania – expected to be operational by 2027. The German army has been chronically under-resourced for years: it is currently approximately 20,000 soldiers short and is struggling to replace much of the vital equipment donated to Ukraine over the past 3.5 years. While Merz eased the country’s state debt rules on coming into power, which will allow a huge boost for military spending in the coming years, it will nevertheless take a while for the full benefits to be felt.
There is, of course, also the question of what Germany’s role in any peacekeeping force would look like in Ukraine. The defence minister Boris Pistorius has kept his cards close to his chest, saying ‘what a German contribution to the security guarantees will look like has not yet been determined’. There is every chance that, should opposition to boots on the ground prove too fierce for Merz to push through the Bundestag, this could be watered down to see the German army simply provide Ukraine with, for example, reconnaissance data and intelligence, further arms deliveries or training for its soldiers.
With little prospect of a ceasefire between Russia and Ukraine any time soon, Merz has time to rally his government, prepare the army and fight off his opponents on the political fringes. But if the first seven months of Trump’s second term have taught the chancellor and his fellow European leaders anything, it is that predictability and caution don’t come naturally to the American president. A peace deal with Moscow could be foisted on Kyiv by Trump at a moment’s notice. Merz has his work cut out ensuring Germany is prepared for that moment when it arrives.
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