Defence

There is something oddly comforting about discussing NATO’s Afghan mission in terms of kit, helicopters and troop numbers – or the lack thereof. These are tangible categories. You either have the right amount or you don’t. And if you don’t, then it is because somebody made the wrong decision or failed to make a timely one. Even Mrs Janes, grief-stricken after the killing of her son, seems to take some comfort in the question of equipment while Liam Fox has made much political capital of the Government’s failures. There are just two problems with this kind of approach to warfare. First, the stories in the press about helicopters take precedence

The Mail has obtained a memo sent to the MoD by Lieutenant Colonel Rupert Thorneloe. He warns that helicopter shortages would cost lives; tragically, he was prescient. The Mail is not publishing the complete memo, which contains sensitive information, but Lt. Col Thorneloe wrote: ‘We cannot not move people, so this moth we have concluded a great deal of administrative movement by road. This increases the IED threat and our exposure to it… The current level of SH (support helicopter) support is therefore unsustainable… and is clearly not fit for purpose.’ This appraisal, widely circulated within the MoD, demolishes Gordon Brown’s denial that helicopter shortages cost lives during Operation Panther’s

Chairman of the Nimrod inquiry Charles Haddon Cave QC is convinced that the fire on board Nimrod XV230 would not have occurred had those tasked with ensuring airworthiness fulfilled their responsibilities. Haddon Cave lists Air Commodore George Baber, Wing Commander Michael Eagles and the leadership of BAE Systems among the chief culprits – the MoD and BAE face costly negligence suits and perhaps criminal proceedings in consequence. Identifying culpable individuals is unusual, illustrating quite how damning this report is to the MoD and the Defence industry – those bodies, as well as allegedly negligent individuals are responsible. The report provides a clear insight into the MoD’s modus operandi. Haddon Cave

So, General Dannatt is to be a Tory Peer. This worries me greatly. On balance, General Dannatt did a good job as Army chief. Not a great job, but a good one. His interventions boosted the morale of frontline troops and his concern for the care of soldiers, especially the wounded, was important. Conversely, many defense analysts thought he was too cautious on military reform, blocking the Army’s transformation into an effective counter-insurgency force and opposing stop gap procurement in case it compromised future acquisition projects. But the real concerns over General Dannatt’s ennoblement are different. General Dannatt should have given his sucecssor a clear run at the job. He should

General Sir Richard Dannatt issues a vociferous condemnation of the government’s commitment to British efforts in Afghanistan in the print edition of today’s Sun. Dannatt asserts that Gordon Brown vetoed increasing the British deployment by 2,000 troops, against the advice of military chiefs. He told the paper: “The military advice has been for an uplift since the beginning of 2009. If the military says we need more troops and we can supply them, then frankly they should take that advice and deploy up to the level we recommend. “If it means finding more resources and putting more energy in, let’s do it. If you’re going to conduct an operation, you’re

The news that General Andrew Mackay has quit over the government’s failure to properly equip the Afghan mission is significant. For one thing, it will have ramifications for the UK US military relationship. Mackay is the British general from whom General Petraeus feels he has learnt the most; Petraeus affectionately called him the “King of Scotland” in his Policy Exchange lecture the other week. Mackay’s departure will increase the US military’s concern about the war-fighting capabilities of the British military.