Eu

The EU withdrawal bill debate is winding on, with MPs criticising the ‘power grab’ planned by ministers. There won’t be any votes until Monday, and unless something changes, it looks as though the legislation will pass its second reading. Assuming that this is the case, it is much more useful to look at who is threatening to make amendments to the bill at Committee stage. The tone of the Brexit-sceptics so far has largely been reasonably respectful, as they are trying to encourage ministers to make concessions ahead of that. It is rare for a government to be defeated in a committee stage vote, but this bill is different as

Labour’s decision to whip against the EU withdrawal bill might well have more of an impact in the Lords than the Commons. In the Commons, as I wrote on Monday, the number of Tory rebels might well be offset by Labour ones—and I suspect that Labour’s decision to whip against the bill at second reading will make it easier for the Tories to peel off Labour rebels on amendments later on. But in the House of Lords, the government doesn’t have any sort of majority. If Labour whip against it there and team up with Liberal Democrat and cross-bench peers,  the bill could end up only passing with significant amendments.

Last night’s TV debate between Angela Merkel and Martin Schulz poses a nagging question for British conservatives. No, nothing to do with Brexit – the subject wasn’t even mentioned. Rather, why was Theresa May so afraid of going toe to toe with Jeremy Corbyn before the General Election? If only she’d done a Merkel and faced off her main rival on television, she might have won a decent majority – just as Merkel looks set to do in three weeks’ time. Like May, Merkel is widely (and quite rightly) regarded as an uninspiring public speaker. Like Corbyn, Schulz is an assured performer, with a polished ‘man of the people’ shtick.

There is a growing perception that Britain is floundering in its EU negotiations, with a professional team from Brussels running rings around our bumbling amateurs. It is an idea that is being put about by the EU’s chief negotiator, Michel Barnier, who this week appealed for Britain to begin ‘negotiating seriously’. As he has found out, the strange dynamic of British public debate at present means that EU spin is repeated uncritically by those hostile to Brexit. It can seem, at times, as if we are in the grip of hysteria normally seen during the final days of an election campaign. This is not to say that the British side

Fifty billion? Seventy-five? In its wilder moments, the FT might even splash on a hundred billion pounds as the minimum cost of our exit from the European Union. As the negotiations over our departure reach perhaps the thorniest issue of all, the final bill will have to be settled. But what should it be? If the hardliners on both side would calm down for a moment, then the answer should be very simple. We should agree to cover the cost of the disruption our departure creates, but only in return for a fair deal on trade. It is probably a mystery to most people why we have to pay anything

For months, Labour has been moving ever closer to the Tory position on Brexit while pretending that it isn’t. First, it backed Brexit. Then in June, John McDonnell told Robert Peston that he couldn’t see continued membership of the single market being ‘on the table’ in Brexit negotiations. He added that people would interpret membership of the single market as ‘not respecting that referendum.’ In July, Jeremy Corbyn told Andrew Marr that single market membership is ‘dependent on membership of the EU.’ Barry Gardiner has even suggested that the UK would become a ‘vassal state’ if it were to remain in the single market after Brexit. Today, Sir Keir Starmer writes in the Observer that, unlike Liam Fox and Philip Hammond,

A key question in the Brexit talks is how any deal between the EU and UK will be upheld. The government has begun to address this today, publishing a paper on enforcement and dispute resolution. One thing is clear: ministers are committed to extricating the UK from the jurisdiction of the European Court of Justice (ECJ). In fact, the main point of the paper could be summed up as spelling out why Britain cannot agree to the ECJ being the arbiter of any Brexit deal. The government is entirely right about this. Sovereign states do not and should not enter into agreements in which the meaning and effect of the

In widely reported remarks earlier this week, Lord Neuberger, the outgoing President of the Supreme Court, called for Parliament to tell our judges very clearly how rulings of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) are to be dealt with after Brexit. Lord Neuberger’s concern is to avoid judges being left without guidance, required simply to do as they see best, which might invite the unfair charge that they are choosing to make law, whereas in fact they would have been left with no alternative. This concern to leave political questions to the political authorities, echoed in a recent speech by the outgoing Lord Chief Justice, Lord Thomas,

The question of what kind of border after Brexit will exist between Northern Ireland and the Republic will, I predict, become a very thorny one indeed as negotiations crawl into the autumn. Talk of ‘putting the border in the Irish Sea’ — somehow leaving the north inside the EU for customs and immigration purposes, but cut off from European funding — was a red herring that provoked DUP tantrums, but more significant was the weekend outburst from Taoiseach Leo Varadkar. As far as his government is concerned ‘there shouldn’t be an economic border… and we’re not going to help [the British] design some sort of border that we don’t believe