Pakistan

Today I joined number of leading Afghan experts, from Ahmed Rashid to Gilles Dorronsoro, in calling on President Obama to change the American strategy in Afghanistan. Based on our work in and on Afghanistan, we wanted to make a number of points just as the White House begins reviewing its strategy: First, that the cost of the war is now over $120 billion per year for the United States alone. This is unsustainable in the long run. Second, despite these huge costs, the situation on the ground is much worse than a year ago because the Taliban insurgency has made progress across the country. The military campaign is suppressing, locally and temporarily, the symptoms of the

The leak that keeps on leaking has one or two embarrassing titbits about our domestic policymakers this morning. Yet far more noteworthy are the documents on Pakistan. While they don’t tell us too much that is surprising – being mostly about the duplicitous game that country is playing with the West – they do highlight some potentially worrying trends. Chief among them is the growing influence of General Ashfaq Pervez Kiyani, the head of Pakistan’s army. His name is littered generously throughout the US briefings, and it is often connected with dangerous conspiracy and double-dealing. One document, for instance, suggests that Kiyani was prepared to overthrow the Pakistani President, Asif

Part of what makes the war in Afghanistan so complicated is how easily the Taliban can be supplied from over the border in Pakistan. Pakistan has been more cooperative recently but the Washington Post reports today that Pakistan has refused a US request to expand the areas in which its drones can operate. The Pakistanis are also resisting requests from the US to take a military grip on North Waziristan, a base for several of the groups fighting the US in Afghanistan. Worryingly, the Post quotes a senior Pakistani military official as saying, “You have timelines of November elections and July x’11 drawdowns – you’re looking for short-term gains,” the

So what is Pakistan up to? Cameron has a point: it is playing a dangerous double game which I once outlined in a piece. But in today’s Spectator, it is all spelled out by a writer who is – in my view – the best authority on this mess and by some margin. Ahmed Rashid, whose book Descent into Chaos is the definitive work on the Afghan war, explains that Karzai has effectively switched sides – he’s given up on Nato (as, it seems, has Cameron) and now wants Pakistan to preside over talks with the Taliban: ” A few months ago Hamid Karzai would have been thrilled to have

The implosion of General McChrsytal’s career has refocused attention on Afghanistan. Reading Peggy Noonan’s column on the subject I was struck by this paragraph reflecting on Jonathan Alter’s reporting of Obama’s decision making process when he ordered the surge: More crucially, the president asked policy makers, in Mr. Alter’s words, “If the Taliban took Kabul and controlled Afghanistan, could it link up with Pakistan’s Taliban and threaten command and control of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons?” The answer: Quite possibly yes. Mr. Alter: “Early on, the President eliminated withdrawal (from Afghanistan) as an option, in part because of a new classified study on what would happen to Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal if the

The proverbial shoe is dropping. Following General Stanley McChrystal’s forced retirement, a consensus is forming that President Obama’s Afghan strategy is not working. The Economist says: ‘Since November, when Mr Obama promised 30,000 more of his country’s soldiers to the campaign, little has gone right. General McChrystal’s plan was for a “surge” that would seize the initiative from the Taliban and create the scope for Afghanistan’s government, backed by its army and police, to take charge. In practice that has not happened.’ In the Financial Times, Ahmed Rashid makes a similar point, arguing that the military strategy in Afghanistan is “failing”. ‘The real crisis, however, is that the US-Nato strategy

Richard Holbrooke, the U.S. diplomat in charge of Afghanistan and Pakistan affairs said Washington has now publicly made clear the US government is serious about negotiating with the Taliban. Speaking at a conference in Madrid, the US envoy said: ‘Let me be clear on one thing, everybody understands that this war will not end in a clear-cut military victory. It’s not going to end on the deck of a battleship like World War Two, or Dayton, Ohio, like the Bosnian war It’s going to have some different ending from that, some form of political settlements are necessary … you can’t have a settlement with al Qaeda, you can’t talk to

In opposition, the Conservatives pursued an AfPak policy that can best be described as loyal criticism – while they supported the mission they criticised the means and methods employed to achieve it. It was an effective line of attack. But now that they have the internal documents and can call for further intelligence assessments, they should instead undertake a zero-based review of the current strategy focusing on: 1) the viability of the current US approach; 2) the likely timing and manner of a US shift; and 3) the best role for the UK in the next six months, in the next 2 years and in the next five years. In