Taliban

On Wednesday, Baroness Kinnock told the Lords that a number of Foreign Office departments had been hit been hit by an estimated £110 million budget shortfall, and that an anti-drug program in Kabul has been cut.  Coming after British dismay at President Karzai’s desire to put Afghanistan’s former (and widely-discredited) Interior Minister, Zarar Ahmad Moqbel, in charge of the country’s anti-drug effort, the cuts are bound to cause concern. Afghanistan is the world’s leading supplier of opiates, trafficked as opium, morphine and heroin. Over 90 percent of the heroin on the UK’s streets originates from Afghanistan. Though cuts to counterterrorism programs are probably ill-advised, there is less reason to worry

Many will claim that the Taliban’s recent attack in Kabul shows how powerful the insurgency has become. No doubt the psychological impact – the real aim of all terrorists – will be felt for some time. Faroshga market, one of the city’s most popular shopping malls, lay in ruins and the normally bustling streets of Kabul emptied. But the attack was an operational failure. All seven militants died in the attack; five were gunned down and two killed themselves. Three soldiers and two civilians — including one child — were killed. Seventy-one others were injured, including 35 civilians, but the majority are only slightly wounded. Such a toll must frustrate

As President Obama continues to consider his options on Afghanistan, The New York Times has a good primer on what the military could do with the various levels of reinforcements being considered. This is what the military believes it could do with an extra 40,000 troops: “Should President Obama decide to send 40,000 additional American troops to Afghanistan, the most ambitious plan under consideration at the White House, the military would have enormous flexibility to deploy as many as 15,000 troops to the Taliban center of gravity in the south, 5,000 to the critical eastern border with Pakistan and 10,000 as trainers for the Afghan security forces. The rest could

Afghan politics stinks; we all know it.  But it’s still shocking to read how the former governor of Helmand, Sher Mohammed Akhundzada, encouraged his supporters to join the Taliban after he lost his position, in 2005, under a cloud of drug-running allegations.  Here’s what he tells today’s Telegraph:   “When I was no longer governor the government stopped paying for the people who supported me ….  I sent 3,000 of them off to the Taliban because I could not afford to support them but the Taliban was making payments. Lots of people, including my family members, went back to the Taliban because they had lost respect for the government. The

David Rohde’s account of being held hostage by the Taliban for seven months is a fantastic piece of journalism, I’d urge you to read the whole thing. One point in it struck me as particularly pertinent to the current debate about Afghanistan: “Over those months, I came to a simple realization. After seven years of reporting in the region, I did not fully understand how extreme many of the Taliban had become. Before the kidnapping, I viewed the organization as a form of “Al Qaeda lite,” a religiously motivated movement primarily focused on controlling Afghanistan. Living side by side with the Haqqanis’ followers, I learned that the goal of the

The Wall Street Journal’s write up of its interview with the new US commander in Afghanistan, General McChrystal, demonstrates why more troops are needed in Afghanistan. The Journal concentrates on the suspicion among some in military circles that the Taliban are using the American emphasis on Helmand to strengthen their grip on Kandahar, the capital of the South and the Taliban’s traditional stronghold. The paper reports that the Taliban are setting up shadow government and court system there. However, McChrystal can’t move troops there until the planned reinforcements arrive as those deployed in Helmand ‘have already set up forward operating bases and recruited help from local tribal leaders, who have

Splits appear to be emerging in the Pakistani Taliban after a US drone-strike reportedly killed its leader. The New York Times says that a ‘Pakistani government official and an intelligence official said Hakimullah Mehsud, a young and aggressive aide to the former Taliban leader, had been shot dead in a fight with Waliur Rehman, another commander who was seeking to become the leader.’ As a US official tells the paper, splits within the group can be exploited by the US and the Pakistanis. Also anything that limits the Pakistani Taliban’s effectiveness is to be welcomed—the Pakistani state fully collapsing under jihadi pressure is the nightmare scenario. However, a split within

If Baitullah Mehsud, the leader of the Pakistani Taliban, has been killed that is a major success which should help both in the fight against the Taliban in Pakistan and Afghanistan; Mehsud had up to 20,000 fighters under his command. It appears that a drone hit his father in law’s house while he was there receiving medical treatment. One of his wives is reported to have also been killed in the strike. Drones are a controversial part of the US arsenal, some argue that the collateral damage they inflict turns the population against the coalition and so make them not worth using. But for this kind of operation they are