Today’s top Westminster read is James Kirkup’s article on the Treasury smart set. It builds a good foundation from which to argue that for all David Cameron and George Osbourne dislike being compared to Tony Blair and Gordon Brown, there remain good grounds for making that kind of comparison. And already we can see, as James says, some daylight between Numbers 10 and 11.
Perhaps we should not make too much of this. Cameron and Osborne remain exceedingly close. Even if most Prime Ministers lose patience with thier Chancellors their relationship is not bound to end acrimoniously. Nevertheless, they begin from a position less propitious than that which faced Blair and Brown when the Labour pair moved in to Downing Street. In the first place, there was a real enthusiasm for the new Labour government; the coalition is not so blessed. Secondly, the economic circumstances are rather different. As everyone knows, these are not boom times.
This sequesters trouble for the years ahead; matters may be made worse by Osborne’s Prime Ministerial ambitions. Like many clever ideas at the Treasury this is one that, from a distance, looks too clever by half. Though this may change, at present Osborne does not seem an obviously Prime Ministerial sort.
Nor is it quite clear how he can acquire the kind of political persona that would assist his Prime Ministerial ambitions. In part that is because Osborne’s role (or one of his roles) is to be the Bad Cop to David Cameron’s Good Cop. Cameron remains more popular than his party and, thus, is an electoral asset to be protected. Other ministers, even including, if necessary, the Chancellor, are pieces to be sacrificed to protect the queen.
Here too we encounter the problem of Osborne’s status. He is both the government’s economic “enforcer” and the Tory party’s chief political strategist. These positions do not necessarily complement one another. Indeed they may often be at odds. Juggling the two is a fraught business.
In any case: planned successions in British politics do not have an enviable record. Perhaps Cameron will be a great success and be fortunate enough to choose the moment and manner of his departure. More probably, he will be denied that luxury. In those circumstances, it seems less probable that the party would look to his closest confidante – and thus a man inextricably connected to failures that will bring Cameron down – and conclude Osborne is the man to right the Tory ship.
Moreoever, Osborne’s apparent ambitions make it more, not less, difficult for him to perform as Chancellor if his decisions are constantly parsed to divine their political, as well as their economic, meaning. The Chancellor’s much-vaunted “economic credibility” (presently perhaps his greatest asset) risks being devalued if the political half of his role is perceived to be trumping his economic responsibilities. Nor, for that matter, does history suggest the Treasury is the best place from which to launch a successful career in the top job.
Kirkup reminds us that Osborne once promised to dismantle Gordon Brown’s “Imperial Treasury” though, as James says with commendable understatement: “I don’t know many people today who have seen much progress towards realising it.” Ambition is an unstable politicial commodity and that, as he ponders Mr Brown’s legacy, is something upon which the present Chancellor of the Exchequer might reflect.
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