Change in Poland looks likely. A second exit poll gives the ruling Law and Justice party (PiS) the most votes, but not enough to form a majority. The nativist right-wing party Konfederacja might’ve helped them form a coalition, but even combined the two parties still don’t have the numbers. Ex-Eurocrat Donald Tusk, who leads Civic Platform (KO), says he has built a coalition with Lewica, on the left, and Third Way (TD), conservatives, that can govern Poland. The result is not particularly good for the Polish people, or for Europe, but the European Commission in Brussels, and progressives on the Continent generally, will be delighted.
Brussels benefits twice over from Tusk’s coalition. First, Poland has been one of the few EU states willing to ignore the bloc’s calls for social reform, to deny the supremacy of European law, and, sometimes, to defy its judicial appointments and immigration and environmental decisions. Whatever happens, those rebellions are likely to stop. All the other parties (bar Konfederacja) are pro-EU: even if PiS did somehow form a minority government, it would have to give way and co-operate with Brussels. Warsaw and Brussels have frequently clashed over the composition of the Polish Constitutional Court, which says that EU law is not necessarily supreme in Poland. This is anathema to KO and its allies.
Second, the demise of PiS will give Brussels more leverage against the EU’s other difficult member state: Hungary. Up till now, Hungary and Poland, while disagreeing fundamentally about arming Ukraine, have made common cause on the need to stand up to Brussels pressure in other areas. At the European Council meeting in June, both countries opposed the new migration pact. There remain other populist governments in the EU, including Robert Fico’s, elected in Slovakia two weeks ago, but nevertheless, the loss of support from Poland, a growing European power, will leave Hungarian premier Viktor Orbán uncomfortably exposed to Brussels’s demands. Berlaymont might even use the opportunity to finally take away Hungary’s EU voting rights under Article 7 of the Treaty on European Union – a process that Poland has always vetoed. The bureaucrats argue Orbán’s government has no regard for fundamental European values of freedom and democracy.
Europe’s social progressives will cheer Tusk’s ascendancy too. On matters like abortion and LGBT rights, where many Poles remain obstinately conservative, many see the EU leadership, which is generally socially progressive, as trying to steamroller reform through, no matter what the citizenry think. A government committed to following the EU line, and meekly allowing EU law to prevail over national sentiment, provides the bureaucrats with a heaven-sent opening. PiS, the party still most popular among voters, which represents Polish feelings on matters like immigration and asylum seekers, will be sidelined or stymied.
European politics aside, Tusk’s coalition will have an in-tray of domestic problems to deal with. Inflation remains too high, government spending needs to be lower, pensions need reforming, and there is concern that privatisation is letting foreigners control vital state assets. A coalition of opposites, reconciling Lewica and the essentially-Christian-Democratic TD, won’t always agree. Poland’s position on Ukraine might change too. While the prospective anti-PiS coalition is officially rock-solid in its support of Kyiv – ironically the only openly Ukraine-sceptic party is Konfederacja – Tusk’s history as an EU bureaucrat may again make the difference. Poland has until now pushed an uncomfortable western Europe to Ukraine’s cause. I wonder whether a Donald Tusk government, elected on a ticket to reconcile Poland to Germany and Brussels, will maintain quite the same pressure.
Perhaps I’m being too pessimistic. After all, a KO-led government might not even last long enough for Tusk to do anything. It’s all very well to cheer on a coalition of progressives to topple PiS, but what then? There is not a great deal in common between KO, Lewica and TD. Each of these parties is itself a confederation of smaller factions. In the longer term, there may be difficulties persuading Lewica, which has a fairly orthodox left-wing economic and social ideology, to continue working with the overwhelmingly socially and fiscally conservative TD. We may see another Polish election rather sooner than many think.
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