Few things get transatlantic political geeks revved up like the Iowa caucuses. If, as Clinton strategist Paul Begala put it, politics is ‘show business for ugly people’, then Iowa is our Eurovision – bizarre, extreme and irreverent, with a cult following among a small section of the public to the bafflement of everyone else. Even the complex electoral system and the seemingly random whims of an exceptionally politicised electorate seem comparable: a candidate is expected to champion the virtues of ethanol subsidies in this corn-rich state, for instance, with the same certainty and regularity as Cyprus giving Greece douze points.
How good a predictor is Iowa?
The caucuses don’t actually have a great record of predicting the eventual nominee. Of the contested caucuses since 1972, the candidate who won in Iowa would go on to secure the GOP nomination in three out of seven contests (though Mitt Romney lost by just 34 votes in 2012), while this figure stands at a more impressive six of nine occasions for Democrats. Bill Clinton, for instance, secured just 3% in 1992 before his ‘comeback kid’ second place finish in New Hampshire. In most ways, like all the early states, Iowa’s role comes in showing which candidates have traction amongst key parts of the electorate and momentum going.
How does it work?
Perhaps one of the reasons Iowa isn’t terribly predictive comes from its arcane ‘voting’ system that requires a remarkable level of political involvement and commitment from its participants – roughly a fifth of those eligible usually end up showing up. Members of the public come to one of 1,681 caucus locations across the state and sit listening to candidates’ representatives give speeches before they get to vote. The Republican process is comparatively simple: they are given a blank sheet of paper on which to write the name of their favoured candidate and these names are tabulated state-wide. The winner is, shockingly, the person with the most votes.
As for the Democrats, following speeches, caucus-goers show their support for a candidate by huddling in a given corner of the room. These numbers are then counted and those caucusing for a candidate receiving less than 15% of those huddled, deemed ‘non-viable’, are asked to caucus for another candidate. The candidate who is ahead after any reallocation wins that caucus. The results shown are the number or proportion of each precinct caucus won. As such, it is possible for a candidate to have more supporters, but like in a parliamentary election, have them heavily concentrated in too few areas to actually win overall.
The Republican candidates
Why might Donald Trump win?
‘The Donald’ has been ahead in virtually all Iowa polls in recent weeks, confounding the pundits and setting the media agenda. Polling also shows he has an uncanny ability to draw support from all corners of the Republican electorate, including a populist championing of ethanol subsidies (in contrast to Ted Cruz). He should build up heavy margins in the more moderate east of the state, along the Mississippi, as well as in the Des Moines area. Though he has never run for public office before, his senior team’s strengths lie in voter registration and mobilisation; if they can get large numbers of newly registered and first-time caucus-goers to the polls, especially in urban centres, they will be difficult to stop.
Why might Ted Cruz win?
The Cruz strategy has relied on Iowa from the start. The state favoured conservative Christians in a similar, if more folksy, mould to the Texas Senator in both 2008 and 2012 (Mike Huckabee and Rick Santorum). His team of battle-hardened campaigners from across the country and Cruz himself won an extremely tough primary to win his Senate seat four years ago. They have been on the ground longer than anyone else, know the terrain and exactly what it will take to win this contest. Their aim will be to increase turnout in rural conservative counties and those along the Nebraska and South Dakota borders, where they expect the Trump excitement to have less traction. Cruz also enjoys clear support form the ‘anti-establishment establishment’: those in the pro-life, gun rights and long-term ‘movement conservative’ community who are suspicious of Donald Trump’s new-found conservatism. Such groups, and their email lists, have a mobilising capacity of their own.
And what’s next?
If Trump wins, as is expected, the performance of Marco Rubio will be key. If Rubio has a good night, especially in somewhere like Polk County (Des Moines) that bears a stronger resemblance to the rest of America than other parts of the state, it could be highly significant – indeed, the story of the night. This would give Rubio a head of steam moving into the more fertile territory of New Hampshire, where he could move ahead of Kasich, Bush, Christie and Cruz to truly challenge Trump’s seemingly unassailable lead.
A Cruz win, and his ensuing surge in New Hampshire and the other early states, would set up the extraordinary scenario in which, given their pathological hatred of Senator Cruz, Donald Trump becomes the Republican establishment candidate. The Republican National Committee leadership and their allies know that should Cruz get to Super Tuesday on 1st March with any degree of momentum, he could sweep the southern states that dominate that contest. They would hold their nose and embrace Mr Trump to stop him.
The Democratic candidates
Why might Hillary Clinton win?
Iowa proved Mrs Clinton’s undoing in 2008 – her defeat by Barack Obama was one from which she never recovered. She wasn’t going to make the same mistake again. She won over every significant state Democratic figure early on, from former Senator Tom Harkin to former Governor Tom Vilsack. It is also likely that Sanders will rack up huge margins in student-heavy and urban liberal precincts, as Howard Dean did in 2004, but that Clinton will top the poll in more precincts across the state, irrespective of how many people turn out. Her campaign has realised their Iowa Achilles heel; they have worked hard to compensate for it.
Why might Bernie Sanders win?
The Sanders campaign, derided by pundits at its outset as a phenomenon that could not be exported beyond ultra-liberal Vermont, has not only succeeded in building a movement across America, but has reached an extraordinary degree of professionalism. Much of their campaign has been taken from the Obama playbook, including the formidable team who provided his analytics operation. Moreover, Iowa is the kind of rural white state where Sanders has won elections for decades, and his protectionist positions play as well amongst the large agricultural community as they do amongst urban liberals. Governor O’Malley’s voters, who will largely be forced to choose between Clinton and Sanders at caucus sites, will likely opt for the Vermont Senator by a two to one margin. Finally, his supporters have been made far more of a values-based offer than those of Mrs Clinton, and seem far more likely to turn out in this low participation contest.
And what’s next?
If Sanders wins, his margin in New Hampshire, where he is already ahead, will no doubt grow. He is unlikely to win either the Nevada caucuses or South Carolina primary, given the dominance, respectively, of Hispanic and African American voters in those states, amongst whom Mrs Clinton performs very well. But he may win enough northern states on Super Tuesday, especially those with caucuses, to keep his campaign alive into March. If he does not win Iowa – he will find it far more difficult to maintain momentum, and even with a New Hampshire victory under his belt, his challenge to the Clinton ‘coronation’ becomes far more difficult.
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