Fighting every inch of the way: the Italian Campaign of 1943

In Whitehall, visible to even the most short-sighted from the gates of Downing Street, stands an outsize statue of Lord Alanbrooke, the strategic adviser to Winston Churchill during the second world war. His job was to help the prime minister see the big picture and concentrate on the decisions that really mattered. This was no easy task. Churchill was both a tricky master and ‘tinkerman’, but Alanbrooke had Ulster blood and knew how to say no.

He also had a remarkable facility for explaining complex strategic problems in simple terms. There is good evidence of this in the BBC archive (and on YouTube) in a television interview he gave in 1957. Wartime strategy, he said, all came down to two decisions. First, should the Allies defeat Germany or Japan first? That was easily agreed: Hitler first. Second, should the Allies attack across the Channel and drive on to Berlin – the direct route the Americans instinctively preferred – or take a more indirect approach through the Mediterranean? This was the option favoured by the British, and it was their view that prevailed when Roosevelt and Churchill met at Casablanca in January 1943. There they decided that there could be no cross-Channel assault in 1943. Doing nothing was not an option. The main land effort would have to be in the Mediterranean.

By September 1943 the Allies had cleared North Africa, seized Sicily and were ready to invade Italy. Mussolini had fallen and the new government in Rome was on the brink of discarding its German alliance and surrendering. Intelligence suggested that when it did so Hitler would abandon the south of the country and withdraw to dig in up north. The Allies, therefore, landed near Naples, expecting an easy run to Rome.