Crimea matters to Russians – whether they adore or abhor Vladimir Putin – in a way none of the other claimed or occupied Ukrainian territories do, and as such the peninsula’s fate will probably be central to any eventual resolution of the current war. That some Ukrainian sources are now talking about a military reconquest in the summer campaign season and others of diplomatic solutions suggests the possibility of movement.
To be sure, there is no fundamental shift in Kyiv’s official position, that Crimea – like all the occupied territories – must be returned to its control, and that this could be by military force if necessary, negotiation if possible. Hawkish military intelligence chief Kyrylo Budanov predicted that Ukrainian forces would be in Crimea by the end of spring, while presidential adviser Mykhailo Podolyak said at the start of this month that it was ‘mathematically proven’ that this would happen within five to six months. However, another adviser to Volodymyr Zelensky, Andriy Sybiha, told the Financial Times this week that Ukraine would negotiate on Crimea if its spring counteroffensive was successful and its forces advanced to the mouth of the peninsula.
Others in Kyiv rushed to affirm that this did not represent a change in Kyiv’s position, let alone a hint that it might give up its claim to Crimea as part of the price for peace. Rather, they said, it was that they would rather Moscow surrender it willingly rather than be forced into it by further bloody fighting.
After all, despite the confident assertions of direct incursions into Crimea – which are likely a mix of bombast and mind game – Kyiv’s strategy is more likely to be to make its retention untenable. In some ways, the parallel is the liberated city of Kherson.
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