When it comes to Donald Trump’s relationship with Nato, there are two principal schools of thought. The first, articulated by Trump’s own former national security advisor, John Bolton, is that the president-elect is hostile to the alliance at an elemental and instinctive level. The second, proposed by those who are favourable to him, argues that Trump’s inflammatory language about Nato’s failures is a performance, which in the past goaded fellow member states into increasing their defence spending. Look not, they say, at what he says, but at the results.
It is indisputable that the financial commitments of member states to Nato now are much higher than when Trump first assumed the presidency in 2017. At that time, only four countries – the United States, the United Kingdom, Greece and Estonia – spent more than 2 per cent of their GDP on defence, an agreed minimum since 2006. That was undoubtedly a grotesque dereliction of duty. In 2024, it is expected that just 23 of the 32 member states will meet the threshold.
How much of this transformation is directly attributable to Trump? He left the White House in 2021, at which point only six countries were meeting the 2 per cent minimum. But it has been argued that 80 per cent of the additional spending by members of the alliance was ‘due to commitments made during Trump’s presidency’.
Perhaps this is true. But it is not mutually exclusive with the idea that Donald Trump in his heart dislikes and distrusts Nato, both as an unnecessary foreign entanglement and a partnership in which the United States is being cheated by lazy European nations. So should Nato fear an American retreat from the alliance once Trump once again takes office?
Bolton, who observed the 45th president at very close quarters for 17 months, has no time for the argument that Trump’s rhetoric should not be taken literally:
I was there when he almost withdrew, and he’s not negotiating… I think there are some Republicans who support Trump out there saying, ‘Oh, it’s, you know, it’s not a big deal. He’s not going to do it, so on and so forth.’ I’m telling you, I was there in Brussels when he damn near did it.
It is a strange assumption, demanded of no other politician than Donald Trump, that we should not believe what he says but that this is a factor which redounds to his credit. It is not a luxury I allow myself. Trump has committed himself to ‘fundamentally reevaluating Nato’s purpose and Nato’s mission’ and has aimed his fire at ‘globalists [who] want to squander all of America’s strength, blood and treasure, chasing monsters and phantoms overseas –while keeping us distracted from the havoc they’re creating right here at home’.
Thanks to the National Defense Authorisation Act for Fiscal Year 2024, the president cannot withdraw the United States from Nato without an Act of Congress or a two-thirds majority in the Senate. Trump would not need to formally leave the alliance, however, to cripple it. A massive reduction in American military and financial contributions and the effective repudiation of Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty, which enshrines the principle of collective defence by member states, would be the end of Nato as a significant organisation.
Let us read the Trump runes for a moment. In February, he said he would ‘encourage [Russia] to do whatever the hell they want’ to Nato members who ‘didn’t pay’ and are ‘delinquent’. He has also said he would end the war in Ukraine ‘in 24 hours’, and his vice-presidential running mate, Senator JD Vance of Ohio, hinted at a ‘peace’ plan which would confirm Russia’s current military gains and ban Ukraine from joining the alliance. In 2020, the Trump administration announced plans to cut troop numbers in Europe by 25 per cent.
In a similar vein, Trump said in July that Taiwan ‘should pay us for defence’, musing that the country ‘took all of our chip business’ and ‘doesn’t give us anything’. Asked in a Bloomberg interview if the United States under his presidency would defend Taiwan against aggression from China, Trump left little room for doubt:
Taiwan is 9,500 miles away. It’s 68 miles away from China… that’s the apple of President Xi’s eye, he was a very good friend of mine until Covid… Taiwan took our chip business from us… I don’t think we’re any different from an insurance policy. Why? Why are we doing this?
We must be realistic here. Donald Trump has strongly indicated or stated that he would not defend ‘delinquent’ Nato allies, Ukraine or Taiwan against aggression, sees international commitments mainly as a financial drain and would like to reduce America’s overseas military deployments. Joining these dots is hardly a challenge. A second Trump administration is likely to reduce its contribution to Nato substantially, which will have a very serious effect on the alliance’s capabilities, not only in overall quantum but also in areas like intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance, air-to-air refuelling, ballistic missile defence, and airborne electromagnetic war.
It remains to be seen whether the United States simply begins to disengage, which would be serious enough, or whether the incoming president actively tries to reduce Nato’s activities. Whatever happens, the secretary general, Mark Rutte, and the alliance’s heads of government need to move fast, think creatively – and spend more.
Watch more on SpectatorTV:
Comments