New virtues for old

It can be reliably predicated that few Spectator readers will disagree with the general thrust of the essays in this volume, which is that our society is a decadent one, in which an emphasis on personal virtue and responsibility is being replaced by the intrusive activities of the nanny state. In every sphere of our public and private lives, there has appeared an army of clip-boarded bureaucrats dedicated to ensuring that at no time does anyone act on their own initiative (this would lack ‘transparency’) or discretion. As Professor Minogue (whose essay shines out even in this distinguished company) argues in his chapter on ‘Prudence’, it is ‘the joker in the moral pack’ in so far as it allows us to temper our virtues according to the circumstances we feel are appropriate; one of the most lamentable aspects of modern life is that the room for its exercise is being constantly diminished by the state.

The first part of this book deals with the ‘old virtues’: prudence; courage; thrift; disinterest and the ‘family virtues’ of authority, obedience, stewardship and succession — all of which would attract the approbation of most readers. The ‘new virtues’ would attract equal amounts of opprobrium: social justice; the environment; ‘caring’; therapy; transparency and accountability; and ‘being critical’. Satisfying as this is, at least viscerally, there is something missing from the analysis. ‘Virtues’ are not just free-floating phenomena, they are anchored in a particular socio-political milieu. The virtues applauded here are generally those of an aristocratic, religious society, where courage, disinterest and authority are greatly valued. In the days when Europe was dominated by the landed aristocracy and the Church, such values flourished, as they did until recently, when European societies still took their tone from their past.