Vladimir Putin’s decision to call up reservists is a sign of Russia’s desperation. It is also unlikely to do anything to address the real problem facing the country’s military: the woeful way in which its troops are organised.
‘No plan of operations,’ wrote Moltke the Elder in 1871, ‘extends with any certainty beyond the first encounter with the main enemy forces.’ The Russian military struggled from the outset in Ukraine, but particular structural issues within the army itself have exacerbated their woes. Sending more troops to Ukraine risks simply plugging gaps left by poor military structuring.
One major limitation of success for the Russian military is its relative lack of non-commissioned officers. NCOs are officers who have usually risen through the enlisted ranks, and are generally considered to be essential components of modern armies. Most armies entrust NCOs with control over the means and methods to complete tactical objectives – in stark contrast to Russia’s use of them.
Russia’s armed forces do contain NCOs, but they fail to hold the same responsibilities that their western counterparts do. Russian NCOs do not dictate the tactical decisions of their units, nor discipline or motivate the troops. Instead, higher-ranking officers assume control of everything. The result is that units are inflexible, chains of command vulnerable, and troop morale low.
Russia’s lack of NCOs might not have affected its efforts in Ukraine quite so terribly if it hadn’t been compounded by a similar relative lack of professional servicemen. Even before Putin’s announcement this week, the Russian army was heavily reliant on poorly-trained conscripts. The reason for this is that professional servicemen (usually referred to in Russia as ‘contract’ soldiers or kontraktniki) are swiftly moved into technical, skill-based roles within the army.
Already a subscriber? Log in
Comments
Don't miss out
Join the conversation with other Spectator readers. Subscribe to leave a comment.
UNLOCK ACCESSAlready a subscriber? Log in