Resolving the conflict in Syria is in Britain’s national interest

There was an air of inevitability about yesterday’s massacre in the Syrian village of Tremseh which left 200 civilians dead. Observers of the Syrian uprising could foretell this grim event after Bashar al-Assad suffered two significant diplomatic setbacks over the last week.

First, one of Assad’s closest friends and the highest ranking Sunni member of his government, General Manaf Tlass, fled to Turkey last week. News of his defection roared through Damascus. He was followed by Nawaf al-Fares, a senior member of the Baath party and accomplished diplomat who has served both Assad père and fils, who announced his defection on Wednesday.

The Tremseh massacre follows a similar incident in Houla just seven weeks ago. An estimated 100 civilians were killed in that incident; with the disturbing revelation that around twenty of the victims executed by Assad’s forces – their throats had been slit – were under the age of 10.

Defections were not the prelude to that massacre. A few days earlier, the Free Syrian Army had managed to poison eight members of Assad’s ‘Crisis Cell’, a team of top military officials who coordinate the army’s response to the uprising. The most high profile casualty of the attack was Assef Showkat, Bashar al-Assad’s brother-in-law and Deputy Defence Secretary.

The month-long siege of Baba Amr in Homs during March was provoked by similar insubordination. The FSA declared the area of Baba Amr a ‘free district’ and successfully held off the Syrian Army when they tried enter. Unable to penetrate FSA defences, they retreated and shelled the area remorselessly.

The pattern is always the same. First, helicopter gunships and tanks attack a densely populated civilian area – then Assad’s brutish paramilitary, known as the shabiha, enter on foot and execute survivors.

This desperation is symptomatic of a regime in terminal decline. Assad’s forces are divided and demoralised with scores of servicemen known to secretly sympathise with the opposition. Indeed, recent reports suggest that members of the Syrian army are themselves one of the biggest supplies of arms to the FSA. Where the two forces clash, the FSA has repeatedly shown itself capable of fending off the army despite the glaring disparity in fire-power between them. 

There is a critical mass of soldiers ready to defect, but they face an uphill battle. Those who desert and join the opposition first have to evacuate their families, knowing what fate would otherwise befall their loved ones, a factor that inhibits many. Tipping the balance in their favour is easier than might be imagined.

It’s a subject the increasingly impressive Henry Jackson Society has given a lot of attention to. Producing a blueprint for intervention, their key recommendations include a Turkish-led initiative (with NATO support) to create humanitarian corridors inside Syria coupled with the imposition of a no fly zone. The plan was endorsed by the Syrian National Council.

Arguments against intervention overlook one crucial fact: that intervention is already taking place. The Russians supply Assad with weapons and aircraft, while Iran is supporting its only regional ally with men and munitions. Hezbollah, the Lebanese terrorist group, has also sent a large number of its fighters to prop up the Syrian army.

Herein lies the point. Intervening along the lines suggested above would do more than simply prevent an ongoing civilian massacre. It would also undermine Iranian power in the Levant, weaken Hezbollah, and overturn a hostile administration in Damascus. Resolving the conflict in Syria is not just in the interests of its citizens – but is also inextricably intertwined with our national interest.