While this new government’s approach to many issues – the NHS, prisons, China policy – seems to start with a ‘review’, a re-examination of defence policy seems reasonable. New Labour launched a Strategic Defence Review shortly after taking office in 1997. The coalition did a defence review in 2010, and David Cameron’s Conservative government undertook a review in 2015.
On 16 July, the Ministry of Defence announced the details of the latest Strategic Defence Review. The headline is that, for the first time, it will be conducted by outsiders rather than government officials. Three eminent defence and security policy experts will lead the process: supported by former US National Security Council director Dr Fiona Hill and one-time head of Joint Forces Command General Sir Richard Barrons, the lead will be taken by Lord Robertson of Port Ellen. Robertson was Tony Blair’s first defence secretary from 1997 to 1999 and oversaw the 1998 Strategic Defence Review, before leaving British politics to be secretary general of Nato.
It is hard to argue against having a major re-evaluation of Britain’s defence policy
Robertson, Hill and Barrons have extensive knowledge of defence and security policy, and a valuable blend of academic and executive experience. A cynic might note that Barrons retired from the army a decade ago, Hill’s career has been largely spent in Washington and Robertson, aged 78, will soon be facing expulsion from the House of Lords under the government’s proposals for a retirement age of 80.
None comes without baggage, either. Barrons told the BBC in 2022 that Nato air power should be used directly against Russian forces in Ukraine. Hill has said that the Capitol riots of 2021 were an attempted coup by Donald Trump. Robertson was critical of the British and American withdrawal from Afghanistan later that year. But no-one with a serious public career is devoid of baggage.
In the deathless prose of Starmer regime, we are told that this is ‘Britain’s review – not just the Government’s’, which means that it will invite submissions from ‘serving and retired members of the Armed Forces, the defence industry, the general public, academics, Parliament, and our closest allies and partners, especially in Nato’. It will focus on the UK’s leading role in Nato, homeland security, military assistance to Ukraine and the ‘One Defence’ model (ensuring that all parts of the defence establishment are focused on a single set of goals and objectives).
Curiously, the review will also look at modernising and maintaining the nuclear deterrent. This was specifically excluded from the SDR in 1998, and rated only a few paragraphs in 2010’s Strategic Defence and Security Review. In any event, as I wrote last month, the Prime Minister has already issued a ‘nuclear triple lock’ pledge, promising to build the four Dreadnought-class ballistic missile submarines planned, maintain continuous at sea deterrence and provide any and all future upgrades required to keep the submarines operational. It is hard to see what value the review can add without infringing this commitment.
There are elements of the SDR which are positive. The contribution of three independent reviewers will hopefully guard against vested interests within the defence establishment (though it should be noted that they will be ‘supported’ by a secretariat from the MoD), and including contributions from outside government is a good idea.
More broadly, it is hard to argue against having a major re-evaluation of Britain’s defence policy. Earlier this year, the House of Commons Public Accounts Committee concluded that the MoD’s Equipment Plan 2023-33 had a deficit of nearly £17 billion. I argued in February that we risked being unable fundamentally to carry out the tasks of national defence, and our reputation with some of our most important allies has declined seriously in recent years.
Shortly before leaving office, Rishi Sunak pledged to increase the UK’s spending on defence to 2.5 per cent of gross domestic product by 2030. While many doubted the likelihood of this coming to pass, it was at least a clear commitment. Sir Keir Starmer has made a ‘cast-iron’ guarantee to do the same, but so far has put no timetable on it. The Strategic Defence Review is intended to provide a ‘roadmap’ for making good on that promise.
Independent opinions inevitably carry the hazard of losing control over their conclusions. We must wait to see what Robertson, Hill and Barrons conclude, but, as the Irish phrase has it, even the dogs in the street know that the biggest problem facing the armed forces is money. Increasing defence spending to 2.5 per cent of GDP will do little more than plug the gaps in existing commitments. It will not give any scope for major new initiatives.
Does the government hope to use the conclusions of an independent review to explain having to raise taxes or make unwelcome cuts elsewhere, as a kind of policy alibi? Are the reviewers intended to ‘say the unsayable’? Or will there be sub rosa negotiations to keep their recommendations within politically acceptable parameters? All will be revealed in the first half of 2025 – but history tells us it is a rare defence review which results in more spending.
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