Today marks twenty years since the Good Friday Agreement. Here, Bruce Anderson writing in the Spectator in April 1998, talks of Tony Blair’s key role in securing a deal:
Occasionally, one is glad to be wrong. In this column last week, I wrote about the imminent collapse of the Ulster peace process. It seemed then as if everything was unravelling; the gaps between the various sides had been narrowed and narrowed, but still seemed insurmountable. The ball had brushed the fielder’s fingers, but was now plunging irrevocably to the ground.
For the previous three months, heads of agreement had been established, along similar lines to the Sunningdale agreement of 1973. The SDLP MP Seamus Mallon has described this new settlement as ‘Sunningdale for slow learners’. But Sunningdale failed, though narrowly. The resulting educational retardation meant 25 years of conflict and more than 2,500 deaths. Hence my despairing tone last week; if Sunningdale mark II also failed, what was to prevent a similarly bloody sequel?
But the same thought had occurred to others.
Get Britain's best politics newsletters
Register to get The Spectator's insight and opinion straight to your inbox. You can then read two free articles each week.
Already a subscriber? Log in
Comments
Join the debate for just $5 for 3 months
Be part of the conversation with other Spectator readers by getting your first three months for $5.
UNLOCK ACCESS Just $5 for 3 monthsAlready a subscriber? Log in