‘The army, navy and air force are so 20th century. Scrap them and have a massive British Marine Corps.’
Just a few hours after the publication of the Strategic Defence and Security Review, two crack teams of speakers clashed over the future of the armed forces at the Spectator debate.
Brigadier Allan Mallinson, the novelist and military historian, proposed the motion with a heavy heart. ‘I love the armed forces,’ he confessed. ‘I watch the “Battle of Britain” with tears in my eyes.’ But the trinitarian approach had failed. He imagined a new combined force under the command of an army general. Admiral Jackie Fisher once remarked, ‘the army should be a projectile fired by the navy’, and it was crucial to remember that ‘it’s the projectile that does the killing.’ During WWII the forces had allowed one service, the RAF, to break out of a co-ordinated strategy and to pursue ‘the false doctrine that aerial bombardment could win the war’. Since then Britain has built up ‘massive capabilities’ by sea and air – forces that can prevent defeat but not deliver victory. The army alone can do that. So the new combined force must be led by a soldier.
Adam Holloway MP, a former Grenadier Guardsman, imagined an army colonel salivating at the prospect of commanding a 2,200-strong marine expeditionary unit equipped with artillery, fast jets, helicopters, amphibious landing trucks and a host of other gleaming kit. But the financial savings of a merged force would be far smaller than was claimed. The outlay on procurement, training, food and accommodation would be unchanged while the cost to morale, and the blurring of services’ individual identities, would be damaging. It was wrong to regard the US Marine Corps as a model because the USMC has only a tactical capability. Our armed services must meet a far wider range of operational and strategic objectives. The Canadians tried to amalgamate their services 20 years ago and it was a disaster. ‘Let’s not cock up the armed forces,’ he said, ‘just to save a bit of money.’
Con Coughlin, executive editor of the Daily Telegraph, claimed that rivalries within the armed forces caused gross inefficiencies and led each service to protect its pet projects. For two decades Britain has kept tons of artillery and countless tanks ‘sitting in Germany to defend ourselves against an attack from Russia’. Our aircraft carriers are designed to provide a sea-borne platform for air power but haven’t fulfilled that role since the Falklands war. He praised the Typhoon – ‘a superb piece of kit’ – but pointed out that it has yet to be deployed to Afghanistan because ‘oh dear, it hasn’t got a ground attack capability.’ And it costs £69m per unit. ‘Look at the forces over the last 20 years and you can see they’re headed for merger.’
Robert Fox, defence correspondent of the Evening Standard, focused on the morale of individual soldiers. The men at Goose Green fought ‘for their mates, their unit and their cap badge.’ Combining the three services would ‘pull the ethos of the army apart’. The Canadian experiment had failed because servicemen ‘hated the idea that a soldier, a sailor and an airman were equivalent to each other, and no better than an auxiliary soldier.’ In Afghanistan he’d witnessed the trust and co-operation between the army and the RAF. The merger plan was ‘a daft idea from the Harvard Business School’ which would create ‘a load of committees fighting each other’. Far better to put one person in charge.
Dr Richard North, of the Bruges Group, pointedly reminded us that the Taleban, ‘who in some ways are running rings around us,’ manage withouth three armed forces. The best fighting units, like the Wehrmacht in WWII, encourage officers to migrate between branches of the service to give them a better understanding of colleagues’ abilities and requirements. Institutional change is needed. The newly combined forces would focus on working for us not against each other. He pointed out that the US Marine Corps with 200,000 personnel costs just two-thirds of our entire defence budget. ‘Who’s getting better value for money?’
General Sir Richard Dannatt, former chief of the general staff, argued that it was folly to emulate the USMC – ‘a tactical expeditionary force’. Britain needs a full spectrum of armed services to protect our airspace, our sea-lanes and to maintain our territorial integrity. The Falklands had taught the benfits of joint action – ‘jointery’ as the services call it – and there had been successful mergers of training facilities and helicopter command structures. He argued that a combined force would not be immune to inter-service rivalries but he regarded such competitiveness as healthy and positive. Regiments in the army ‘compete to raise standards’. Referring to the Coalition’s promise to review Britain’s defence requirements every five years, he said, ‘this is the opening salvo.’
The general and his team defeated the motion soundly.
Pre-vote:
For: 29
Against: 46
Don’t Know: 46
End vote:
For: 38
Against: 88
Don’t Know: 0
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